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INTRODUCTION
The duty of fair representation is defined by a body of judge-
made law that has developed around the fiduciary-type duty a
union owes the workers it serves as bargaining agent. The doc-
trine regulates union conduct in both negotiating and administer-
ing the collective bargaining agreement." By far, the most com-
mon application of this body of law is in the context of union
grievance handling, most frequently involving the handling of dis-
charge grievances.2
In a line of cases culminating in Vaca v. Sipes3 and its progeny,
the Supreme Court held that an employee allegedly discharged
without good cause (or otherwise injured by an employer's breach
of a collective bargaining agreement) is barred from bringing a
breach of contract action against his or her employer where a po-
tential remedy is available to the employee pursuant to a contrac-
tual grievance procedure. The employee must utilize the griev-
ance procedure provided in the agreement. Moreover, the
employee is bound by the results of that grievance procedure,
even if a meritorious grievance was lost because of poor judgment
on the part of the union officials who handled the grievance, or
because the union simply decided not to take the grievance to ar-
bitration because it thought the chances of winning were small.
The principal exception to this rule arises where an employee
can prove that the grievance was lost because, in handling the
grievance, the union breached its duty of fair representation
through conduct which was arbitrary, discriminatory, perfunctory,
or in bad faith.4 In such cases, the plaintiff employee typically sues
1. See infra text accompanying notes 25-54.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 152-55, 167-68.
3. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
4. Id. at 190-91.
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both the union and the employer as codefendants in what has be-
come known as a "hybrid § 301/fair representation claim. '", To
prevail in such an action, the plaintiff must prove not only that
the discharge was in violation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, but also that the plaintiff's failure to prevail in the griev-
ance procedure was due to the union's breach of its duty of fair
representation.6
This cause of action has proven to be one of the most contro-
versial in all labor law. Plaintiffs, or at least those plaintiffs who
are represented by knowledgeable counsel,7 are reluctant to use it
because it pits the individual employee against the combined
forces of the union and the employer.' In addition, the courts
have made it very difficult to prove a breach of the duty: even
proof of gross negligence is often not enough.9 Unions, on the
other hand, claim that they are the targets of so many of these
suits that, even though they win most of them, defense costs are a
severe drain on union treasuries. Moreover, fearing these suits,
unions often take weak cases to arbitration, which both clogs the
grievance system and further drains union resources.10 Finally,
employers dislike the cause of action because they believe it un-
5. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983). This
cause of action is "hybrid" because it actually entails two separate claims-one against the
union and one against the employer-rooted in different substantive and jurisdictional stat-
utory provisions. See infra text accompanying notes 25-32, 42-53. While plaintiffs are not
required to sue both the union and the employer in a single action, Vaca, 386 U.S. at 186,
they do so most of the time. See infra text accompanying notes 129 & 130. Even where the
plaintiff sues only the employer, however, he or she must still prove a breach of the duty
on the part of the union.
6. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 193.
7. Unfortunately, economic factors and political considerations within the labor bar
make it very difficult for potential plaintiffs to obtain the representation of experienced
labor lawyers for duty of fair representation litigation. See infra note 198.
8. See, e.g., Tobias, The Plaintiffs View, in THE CHANGING LAW OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
(J. McKelvey, ed. forthcoming 1985) [hereinafter cited as THE CHANGING LAW]; Tobias, A
Plea for the Wrongfully Discharged Employee Abandoned by His Union, 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 55
(1972).
9. See, e.g., Dober v. Roadway Express, Inc., 707 F.2d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1983) ("negli-
gence, even when gross, does not violate the duty of fair representation"); but see Dutrisac
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 749 F.2d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 1983) ("negligence may breach
the duty of fair representation [where] ...the individual interest at stake is strong and
the union's failure to perform a ministerial act completely extinguishes the employee's
right to pursue his claim").
10. See, e.g., Waldman, A Union View, in THE CHANGING LAW, supra note 8. See also
Vladeck, The Conflict Between the Duty of Fair Representation and the Limitations on Union Self-
Government, in THE Dtrrv OF FAIR REPRESENTATION (J. McKelvey ed. 1977).
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dermines the finality of grievance procedures by giving discharged
employees a second bite of the apple, and because it subjects em-
ployers to the costs of defending suits made necessary by the
wrongful conduct of unions.'
Although much has been written on the duty of fair represen-
tation, 12 most of it has been theoretical or policy oriented with
very little empirical grounding regarding the actual dispositions of
these cases in the courts. 13 For example, Professor David Feller, a
11. See, e.g., Christianson, A Management View, in THE CHANGING LAW, supra note 8.
Another basis of employer opposition to this cause of action-that it exposes employers to
increased liability for breach of contract because of the delay in obtaining final resolution
of such claims-was in large part eliminated by the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983) (unions liable for all back pay
accrued after the date on which the grievance would have been resolved absent the union's
breach of the duty). See infra text accompanying notes 91-95.
12. For a sampling of this extensive literature, see generally T. BOYCE, FAIR REPRESEN-
TATION, THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS (1978); THE CHANGING LAW, supra note 8; THE DUTY
OF FAIR REPRESENTATION, supra note 10; Aaron, The Union's Duty of Fair Representation
Under the Railway Labor and National Labor Relations Acts, 34 J. AIR L. & COM. 167 (1968);
Cheit, Competing Models of Fair Representation: The Perfunctory Processing Cases, 24 B.C.L.
REV. 1 (1982); Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEX. L. REV.
1119 (1973); Finkin, The Limits of Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 64 MINN. L. REv.
183 (1980); Freed, Polsby & Spitzer, Unions, Fairness, and the Conundrums of Collective
Choice, 56 S. CAL L. REV. 461 (1983); Harper & Lupu, Fair Representation as Equal Protec-
tion, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1985); Leffler, Piercing the Duty of Fair Representation: The Di-
chotomy Between Negotiations and Grievance Handling, 1979 U. ILL L.F. 35; Summers, The
Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representa-
tion?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251 (1977); VanderVelde, A Fair Process Model for the Union's Fair
Representation Duty, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1079 (1983). Surprisingly few of the leading commen-
tators have given substantial attention to the important procedural aspects of this cause of
action. For some noteworthy exceptions, see T. BOYCE, supra; C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW 1285-1358 (2d ed. 1983); Fox & Sonenthal, Section 301 and the Exhaustion of
Intra-Union Appeals: A Misbegotten Marriage, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 989 (1980); Tobias, Individ-
ual Employee Suits for Breach of the Labor Agreement and the Union's Duty of Fair Representation,
5 U. ToL L. REV. 514 (1974). 1
13. Several commentators conducted surveys of reported decisions in the early 1970's,
but the number of factors and variables examined was limited. See, e.g., Koretz & Rabin,
Arbitration and Individual Rights, in AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, THE FUTURE OF LABOR ARBrrRA-
TION IN AMERICA 113, 125 (1976); Tobias, supra note 12. More recently, several commenta-
tors have used LEXIS or WESTLAW to survey reported fair representation decisions, but
none have attempted to quantify their findings in any systematic way. See, e.g., Freed, Pol-
sby & Spitzer, supra note 12, at 463 n.2; Jones, The Concept of the Duty of Fair Representation:
The Time Has Come For a Mid-Course Correction, in THE CHANGING LAW, supra note 8; Rabin,
The Duty of Fair Representation in Arbitration, in THE CHANGING LAW, supra note 8; Vander-
Velde, supra note 12, at 1082 n.8. Although there has been some empirical study of the
duty of fair representation as it is perceived by union officials, see Schwartz, Different Views
of the Duty of Fair Representation, 34 LAB. L.J. 415 (1983), no study has been located which
has examined unreported duty of fair representation cases, or which attempted to deter-
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major architect of modern American labor law,1 recently sug-
gested that plaintiffs in hybrid section 301 suits have greater suc-
cess proving a breach of the duty on the part of the union than
they do in proving the underlying breach of contract on the part
of the employer.1 5 As an occasional lawyer in duty of fair repre-
sentation cases, my impression was just the opposite. The point, of
this example is that, without empirical data, neither of us has any-
thing more to base our assertions on than anecdotal evidence or
unsubstantiated hunches.1 6
In recent years, legal scholars have displayed an increasing in-
terest in empirical research in labor law1 7 and in other areas of
mine the ultimate outcome of cases in which the reported decisions were not final judg-
ments. For the results of a very interesting, though often overlooked, empirical study of
New Jersey's brief experiment in permitting employees to arbitrate grievances their unions
refused to press, see Blumrosen, Workers' Rights Against Employers and Unions: Justice Fran-
cis-A Judge For Our Season, 24 RUrGERs L. REv. 480, 488-89, 492-99 (1970).
14. Professor Feller argued on behalf of the unions in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967), and in the Steelworkers Trilogy: United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). For
Professor Feller's views on the duty of fair representation, see Feller, A General Theory of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALF. L. REV. 663 (1973).
15. Feller, Response: The Structure of Post-War Labor Relations, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L, & SoC.
CHANGE 136, 140 (1982).
16. Indeed, one study was recently criticized because it was based on an examination
of "no relevant cases whatever." Hyde, Can Judges Identify Fair Bargaining Procedures?: A
Comment on Freed, Polsby & Spitzer, Unions, Fairness, and the Conundrums of Collective Choice,
57 S. CAL L. REv. 415, 417 (1984).
17. One of the best known, and most controversial, empirical studies in labor law is J.
GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG, & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELEGrIONS: LAW AND REALITY
(1976), which was heavily relied upon by a majority of the National Labor Relations Board
in Shopping Kart Food Markets, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977) (adopts laissez-faire ap-
proach to misrepresentation in union representation elections). See generally Four Perspec-
tives on Union Representation Elections: Law and Reality, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1976). An-
other influential study with a distinctly empirical slant-and which inspired the title of this
Article-is Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do In Fact, 70 Yale L.J.
175 (1960). For other examples of empirical research in the field of labor law, as well as
discussions of the need for more such research, see D. McLAUGHLIN & A. SCHOOMAXER, THE
LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT AND UNION DEMOCRACY (1979); Brett & Goldberg, Grievance Media-
tion in the Coal Industry: A Field Experiment, 37 INDUS. & LAB. Rn. REV. 49 (1983); Chaney,
The Reinstatement Remedy Revisited, 32 LAB. L.J. 357 (1981); Cooper, Authorization Cards and
Union Representation Election Outcome: An Empirical Assessment of the Assumption Underlying the
Supreme Court's Gissel Decision 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 87 (1984); Dworkin & DeNisi, Empirical
Research in Labor Relations Law: A Review, Some Problems, and Some Directions for Future Re-
search, 28 LAB. L.J. 563 (1977); Henry, Empirical Data and Statistical Analysis in Labor Law,
1981 U. ILL L. REV. 1; Roomkin, A Quantitative Study of Unfair Labor Practice Cases, 34
INDUS. & LAB. RF. REV. 245 (1981); Scott & Taylor, An Analysis of Absenteeism Cases Taken to
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the law as well. 18 Empirical study in the field of labor law is partic-
ularly important because of the Supreme Court's stated goal of
rooting its labor law decisions in "the realities of labor relations
and litigation." 19 Indeed, the duty of fair representation doctrine
itself is a prime candidate for empirical study, not only because it
has been the subject of increasing scrutiny by the Supreme Court
in recent years,20 but also because the Labor and Employment
Law Section of the American Bar Association has been drafting a
proposed statute to be presented to members of Congress as a
means of restructuring the entire doctrine.21
The purpose of this Article is to remedy this lack of concrete
evidence of what actually happens to duty of fair representation
cases in the courts,2 2 so that Congress or the courts can make
more informed judgments about how this cause of action should
be reformed, if at all. After tracing the development, and current
Arbitration: 1975-1981, 38 ARB. J., Sept. 1983, at 61.
18. See, e.g., P. DANZON & L. LILLARD, THE RESOLUTION OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS (1982); Dispute Processing and Civil Litigation, 15 L. & Soc'y REv. 385 (1980). Frank-
lin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RE-
SEARCH J. 455; Givelber, Bowers, & Blitch, Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of
Private Law in Action, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 443; Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1984); Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87
HARV. L. REv. 321 (1973); Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordi-
nary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72 (1983); Zeisel & Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Chal-
lenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491
(1978); Note, The Rule 23(bX3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62 GEo. L.J. 1123 (1974).
For an excellent discussion of the need for empirical research as an antidote to the dangers
of what might be called "herd scholarship," see Galanter, Reading the Landscapes of Dis-
putes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious
and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 61-65 (1983).
19. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 167 (1983). This
opinion later quotes Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Humphrey v. Moore, 375
U.S. 335, 358 (1964):
[I]n this Court's fashioning of a federal law of collective bargaining, it is of the
utmost importance that the law reflect the realities of industrial life and the
nature of the collective bargaining process. We should not assume that doc-
trines evolved in other contexts will be equally well adapted to the collective
bargaining process.
DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 151.
20. See, e.g., DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 151; Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S.
212 (1983); Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679 (1981); United Parcel Serv. v. Mitchell, 451
U.S. 56 (1981); IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
21. See A.B.A., Recommendations and Report of the Section on Labor and Employ-
ment Law, Drafts 3633c and 4619c (May 10, 1982).
22. This Article does not address the duty of fair representation as it has been devel-
oped and enforced by the National Labor Relations Board. See infra note 48.
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status, of the doctrine in the courts, this Article reports the results
of an extensive survey of all the duty of fair representation opin-
ions published from 1977 through-1983, combined with a study
of the courthouse files of all the duty of fair representation cases
filed in three federal-district courts between 1977 and 1982, sup-
plemented by a mail and telephone survey of the lawyers involved
in these cases.
Among the most striking of the study's findings is that plain-
tiffs win less than five percent of the duty of fair representation
cases they file.23 Moreover, the merits of the plaintiffs' claims are
never reached in approximately forty-five percent of these cases
because plaintiffs fail to overcome such procedural obstacles as a
short limitations period or a requirement that they exhaust inter-
nal union remedies as a prerequisite to filing suit."' In light of
these findings, this Article evaluates the charge, often made by
plaintiffs' lawyers, that the duty of fair representation is little
more than an empty promise which ultimately fails to provide
workers with meaningful protection from arbitrary, discrimina-
tory, or perfunctory union conduct.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
A. The Substantive Framework
The duty of fair representation was created in 1944 by the
Supreme Court in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad"5 Its
original purpose was to remedy racial discrimination in union con-
tract negotiations.2" In Steele, a black locomotive fireman sought
to enjoin the enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement
that an all white union had negotiated. This contract would have
ultimately eliminated black firemen from the railroad's employ,
and have replaced them with whites. The Court upheld the plain-
tiff's claim, stating that when a union becomes the exclusive repre-
23. See infra text accompanying note 172-73.
24. See infra text accompanying note 189 (Table 17).
25. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
26. See generally Herring, The "Fair Representation" Doctrine: An Effective Weapon Against
Union Racial Discrimination?, 24 MD. L. REV. 113 (1964); Jones, The Origins of the Concept of
the Duty of Fair Representation, in THE Durty OF FAIR REPRESENTATION, supra note 10, at 25.
For an insightful reexamination of Steele and its role in the development of both labor law
and civil rights law, see Klare, The Quest for Industrial Democracy and the Struggle Against
Racism: Perspectives from Labor Law and Civil Rights Law, 61 OR. L. REV. 157, 185-98 (1982).
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sentative of the employees in a bargaining unit, it assumes "at
least as exacting a duty to protect equally the interests of the
members of the craft as the Constitution imposes upon a legisla-
ture to give equal protection to the interests of those for whom it
legislates.1 7 As a result, the union must represent in contract ne-
gotiations "non-union or minority union members of the craft
without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good
faith." '28 While unions are not barred from making distinctions
among members of a craft on such relevant criteria as seniority or
the type of work performed, "discriminations based on race alone
are obviously irrelevant and invidious. "29
Although Steele arose under the Railway Labor Act,30 the
Court soon applied the duty of fair representation to cases arising
under the National Labor Relations Act. 1 Neither statute makes
mention of the duty, but the Court inferred its presence from the
statutory provisions granting a union selected by a majority of the
members of a bargaining unit the status of exclusive bargaining
agent for all of the employees in that unit.32
27. Steele, 323 U.S. at 202. In addition to this equal protection basis for the duty of
fair representation, the Court also rooted the doctrine in the fiduciary duty an agent owes
its principal. As the Court stated:
It is a principle of general application that the exercise of a granted power to
act in behalf of others involves the assumption toward them of a duty to exer-
cise the power in their interest and behalf, and that such a grant of power will
not be deemed to dispense with all duty toward those for whom it is exercised
unless so expressed.
Id. See Jones, supra note 26 at 27-28.
28. Steele, 323 U.S. at 204.
29. Id. at 203.
30. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982). See also Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard,
343 U.S. 768 (1952); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210
(1944).
31. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). See Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union Local 23, 350
U.S. 892, rev'g per curiam 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S. 330 (1952).
32. The Railway Labor Act (RLA) provides in pertinent part, "[e]mployees shall have
the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing. The majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to determine who
shall be the representative of the craft or class for the purposes of this [Act]." 45 U.S.C. §
152, Fourth (1982). Similarly, section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
provides that
[rlepresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes,
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for pur-
poses of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
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The Court next extended the doctrine by holding that it ap-
plies to cases not involving invidious racial discrimination. In Ford
Motor Co. v. Huffman,3 3 employees challenged the validity of se-
niority provisions in a collective bargaining agreement which gave
preferential treatment to veterans of pre-employment military ser-
vice. Although the Court found the seniority provisions to be
within the "wide range of reasonableness" unions must be allowed
in collective bargaining,3 4 the Court nowhere hinted that its hold-
ing was based on the absence of allegations of racial discrimina-
tion.3 5 Indeed, the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19648 has made the duty of fair representation much less impor-
tant as a remedy for racial discrimination, and since that year,
only one of the many duty of fair representation cases heard by
the Supreme Court has involved allegations of such misconduct.3
In Conley v. Gibson8 the Court extended the duty's reach be-
yond contract negotiation to contract administration. As Justice
Black wrote for a unanimous Court:
The bargaining representative's duty not to draw 'irrelevant and invidious'
ment, or other conditions of employment.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
Had the Court not inferred the existence of the duty of fair representation as a statu-
tory limitation on a union's power over the workers that the union represents, it would
have had to address constitutional questions concerning congressional delegation to unions
of the power to engage in invidious discrimination. Steele, 323 U.S. at 198. Indeed, Justice
Murphy would have based the Court's decision in Steele directly on constitutional grounds,
Id. at 208 (Murphy, J., concurring).
Because the RLA and the NLRA are statutes regulating commerce, duty of fair repre-
sentation claims in federal court are jurisdictionally based on 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982).
Since the elimination of the amount in controversy requirement for general federal ques-
tion jurisdiction, duty of fair representation claims can also be based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1982). The suggestion found in some cases, such as Amalgamated Ass'n of Motor Coach
Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 298-99 (1971), that jurisdiction over duty of fair
representation claims can be based on section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations
(Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982), is, in the words of Professor Feller, "clearly
wrong." Feller, supra note 14, at 808.
33. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
34. Id. at 338, 342.
35. A few lower federal courts assumed that duty of fair representation remedies were
available only in cases of race discrimination, but that trend was shortlived. See, e.g.,
Alabaugh v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 222 F.2d 861 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 839 (1955),
overruled by Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 316 F.2d 191 (4th Cir.
1963).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
37. See Glover v. St. Louis & S.F. R.R., 393 U.S. 324 (1969).
38. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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distinctions among those it represents does not come to an abrupt end...
with the making of an agreement between union and employer. Collective
bargaining is a continuing process. Among other things, it involves day-to-
day adjustments in the contract and other working rules, resolution of new
problems not covered by existing agreements, and the protection of em-
ployee rights already secured by contract. The bargaining representative can
no more unfairly discriminate in carrying out these functions than it can in
negotiating a collective bargaining agreement. A contract may be fair and
impartial on its face yet administered in such a way, with the active or tacit
consent of the union, as to be flagrantly discriminatory against some mem-
bers of the bargaining unit.39
Although Conley clearly provided employees with a remedy for a
union's wrongful refusal to process a grievance, 0 the Court was
not asked to determine what right such employees might have to
seek relief against their employers directly.41 Nor was the Court
required to determine the rights of employees against their em-
ployers or unions if their grievances were only partially processed,
or processed to unsuccessful conclusions.
The first of these questions was answered in 1962 by Smith v.
Evening News Association,42 in which the Court held that individual
39. Id. at 46 (footnotes omitted). In Conley, an employer had discharged or demoted
45 black workers in violation of their collective bargaining agreement and replaced them
with whites. When the discharged workers complained to their union, it refused to process
their grievances or otherwise assist them. The Court held that such conduct violated the
union's duty of fair representation.
In contract administration, the duty of fair representation is not as directly rooted in
the union's status as exclusive bargaining agent as it is in contract negotiation, because the
provisos in section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982), and
section 3 First (j) of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (j) (1982), expressly
reserve for individual employees a role in presenting grievances to their employers. Never-
theless, most unions assert through the collective bargaining agreements they negotiate the
exclusive authority to process and settle grievances, and it is this contractually created
power that provides a further basis for the duty of fair representation. See Summers, supra
note 12, at 254-56.
40. 355 U.S. at 46.
41. The plaintiffs in Conley sought no relief from their employer, in all likelihood be-
cause they knew that section 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i)
(1982), conferred exclusive jurisdiction over such disputes upon the National Railroad Ad-
justment Board. The Adjustment Board has no jurisdiction, however, over disputes be-
tween railway unions and the workers they represent. Conley, 355 U.S. at 44-45. For a
discussion of some of the unique jurisdictional problems that arise in duty of fair represen-
tation cases under the Railway Labor Act, see Comment, Jurisdiction Over Intertwined Con-
tract Violation and Fair Representation Claims Under the Railway Labor Act: Richins v. South-
ern Pacific Co., 66 MINN. L. REv. 209 (1981). See also Feller, supra note 15, at 676-86, 692-
700, 707-10.
42. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
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employees could sue their employers under section 301(a) of the
Labor Management Relations Act 43 in order to vindicate "per-
sonal" claims created by collective bargaining agreements, such as
those for wages owed or for wrongful discharge. This right to sue
was soon qualified, however, by Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,** in
which the Court held that where a collective bargaining agree-
ment contained a grievance procedure designated by the parties
as the exclusive means of resolving grievances under the agree-
ment, individual employees must attempt to exhaust that proce-
dure before bringing suit under section 301."
Several years later in Vaca v. Sipes,4" the Court dealt with the
second pivotal question that it had left open in Maddox:47 What if
the employee is prevented from exhausting the grievance proce-
dure because the union refuses to process the grievance, or fails to
process it to a successful conclusion? The Court's answer was that
the employee could proceed with a section 301 suit against the
43. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982). This section provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any dis-
trict court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without re-
spect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
Id.
44. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
45. Over a strong dissent from Justice Black, Justice Harlan's majority opinion rea-
soned that exhaustion of contractual grievance procedures was required by federal labor
policy which expressly declared "[f]inal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties
. . . to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising" under collec-
tive bargaining agreements. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982). The exhaustion requirement was
seen as furthering the union's status as exclusive bargaining representative and enhancing
its prestige with the employees it represents, while at the same time furthering the em-
ployer's interest by limiting the remedies available to its employees. Maddox, 379 U.S. at
653. Justice Black objected to this view, however, as manifesting a preference "for accom-
modating the wishes of employers and unions in all things over the desires of individual
workers." Id. at 663 (Black, J., dissenting).
Exhaustion of contractual remedies is not required where the contractual remedies
were not designed either to reach disputes of the type in question, or to be the exclusive
means of resolving grievances under the contract. Any doubts about the grievance proce-
dure's coverage, however, must be resolved in favor of coverage. Id. at 657-59 (citing
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960)). Individual
employees may also forego contractual grievance procedures where "the conduct of the
employer amounts to a repudiation of those contractual procedures." Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171, 185 (1967).
46. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
47. Maddox, 379 U.S. at 652.
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employer only if it could be proven that the union's failure to
properly handle the grievance amounted to a breach of the
union's duty of fair representation."8 Moreover, the Court held
that such a breach "occurs only when a union's conduct toward a
member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discrimina-
tory, or in bad faith."49 Thus, while the Court stated that a union
"may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it
in perfunctory fashion," it also asserted that no "employee has an
48. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 185-87. Vaca actually involved only duty of fair representation
claims brought against a union for refusing to take a discharge grievance to arbitration; the
related breach of contract claim was asserted against the employer in a separate action. Id.
at 176 n.4. The original plaintiff, Benjamin Owens, had been on a medical leave from his
job at a meat packing plant because of high blood pressure. He attempted to return to
work after his own doctors certified him as fit, but the company doctor concluded that
Owens' blood pressure was still too high, and Owens was permanently discharged on the
grounds of poor health. Owens' union processed his grievance through several steps of the
contractually established grievance procedure, but when another doctor examined Owens
at union expense, and agreed with the company doctor that Owens was not fit for work,
the union decided not to take the grievance to arbitration. Id. at 174-75.
The plaintiff had prevailed before a jury in state court, but because the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) had recently held that a union's breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation was an unfair labor practice, Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforce-
ment denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963), the defendant union argued that such claims were
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board and could not be heard by the courts. Vaca,
386 U.S. at 176. It was in rejecting this preemption argument thatJustice White's majority
opinion discussed the relationship between section 301 suits against employers for breach
of contract, and suits against unions for breach of the duty of fair representation. Id. at
183-88.
It is now well settled that the NLRB and the courts have concurrent jurisdiction over
allegations that a union has breached its duty of fair representation. Both forums have
advantages and disadvantages for aggrieved workers. NLRB proceedings are usually faster,
and the charging party need not hire a lawyer or incur the out-of-pocket costs entailed in
litigation. On the other hand, charging parties have less control over NLRB proceedings,
and some important remedies, such as reinstatement, may not be available because employ-
ers are generally not named as respondents. See T. BOYCE, supra note 12, at 83-85. More-
over, as an administrative agency influenced by the shifting winds of the political process,
the NLRB occasionally has periods during which it is not particularly solicitous of the in-
terests of individual employees. See, e.g., Levy, The Unidimensional Perspective of the Reagan
Labor Board, 16 RtrrGERS L. J. (forthcoming 1985). For further discussion of the duty of
fair representation doctrine before the NLRB, see NLRB, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUN-
SEL, SECTION 8(b)(1)(A) CASES INVOLVING A UNION'S DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION (Memo-
randum 79-55, July 9, 1979) reprinted in BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, LAB. RL.. Y.B.-1979
(1980) [hereinafter cited as NLRB MEMO]; T. BOYCE, supra note 12; C. MORRIS, supra note
12, at 1285-1347; Fanning, The Duty of Fair Representation, 19 B.C.L. REV. 813 (1978);
Schwartz, The National Labor Relations Board and the Duty of Fair Representation, 34 LAB. L.J.
781 (1983); Note, The NLRB and the Duty of Fair Representation: The Case of the Reluctant
Guardian, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 437 (1977).
49. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190.
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absolute right to have his grievance taken to arbitration."50
Finally, in 1976, the Court made its last substantive expansion
of the doctrine in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.5 1 In this case,
the Court held that even where a union has taken an employee's
grievance all the way through arbitration or a similar final and
otherwise binding step in the contractual grievance procedure,
the employer may still be sued for breach of contract under sec-
tion 301 if the union's handling of the grievance breached the
duty of fair representation in a way that "seriously undermine[d]
the integrity of the arbitral process. '5 2 As Justice White wrote for
the majority, "we cannot believe that Congress intended to fore-
close the employee from his § 301 remedy.. . if the contractual
processes have been seriously flawed by the union's breach of its
50. Id. at 191. As he had done in Maddox, Justice Black again wrote a strong dissent,
arguing that the majority's decision enhances the interests of unions and employers at the
expense of individual employees:
Either the employee should be able to sue his employer for breach of contract
after having attempted to exhaust his contractual remedies, or the union should
have an absolute duty to exhaust contractual remedies on his behalf. The mer-
its of an employee's grievance would thus be determined by either a jury or an
arbitrator. Under today's decision it will never be determined by either.
Id. at 208 (Black, J., dissenting). Vaca thus resolved a major policy debate in the 1950's and
1960's concerning the competing interests of the union and the individual employee in con-
trolling grievances under collective bargaining agreements. See VanderVelde, supra note
12, at 1082 n.9. Some of the principal arguments in that debate were set forth in Blum-
rosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control of the
Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MicH. L. REv. 1435 (1963); Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agree-
ment, 69 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1956); and Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements
and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 362 (1962), all of which were cited by the Court in Vaca,
386 U.S. at 190-91.
51. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
52. Id. at 567. In Hines, several truck drivers were discharged for allegedly falsifying
motel receipts in order to obtain reimbursement from their employer in amounts greater
than they actually spent. In fact, the truck drivers were innocent of any wrongdoing; it was
the motel clerk who had falsified motel records in order to steal from his employer. How-
ever, this fact was not discovered until after the discharges were upheld by a joint labor-
management grievance committee because the union had specifically refused the employ-
ees' request to investigate the motel. Id. at 556-58. The drivers sued both the union and
the employer in a hybrid 301/fair representation action. The district court granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendants, but the court of appeals reversed as to the union. It
held that evidence of political antagonism toward the plaintiffs within the union was suffi-
cient evidence of bad faith or arbitrary conduct on the part of the union to warrant a trial.
The judgment in favor of the employer was affirmed, however, on the ground that the
employer had not participated in the union's breach and therefore should be able to rely
on the finality of the contractual grievance procedure. Id. at 559-61. The plaintiffs ob-
tained Supreme Court review of the circuit court's ruling in favor of their employer, but
the union did not seek such review of the ruling against it. Id. at 561 n.7.
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duty to represent employees honestly and in good faith and with-
out invidious discrimination or arbitrary conduct. ' 53 The opinion
did stress, however, that "grievance processes cannot be expected
to be error-free," and that "mere errors in judgment" on a
union's part will not constitute a breach of the duty."
B. The Search for a Standard: "Still Crazy After All These Years" 5
The Supreme Court has not defined with precision the stan-
dard for proving a breach of the duty of fair representation. As
noted in the preceding section, the early cases focused primarily
on race discrimination in contract negotiations, and held that a
union has a "duty to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it
in behalf of all those for whom it acts;" this meant that unions
could not engage in "hostile," "irrelevant," or "invidious" dis-
crimination.56 In other words, unions must "represent non-union
or minority union members of the craft without hostile discrimi-
nation, fairly, impartially, and in good faith. ' 57 Later cases clearly
stated that, at least in contract negotiations, unions must be per-
mitted "a wide range of reasonableness," and that the "complete
satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected,"
so long as differences in treatment are based on relevant criteria
such as seniority.58
With the extension of the duty of fair representation into the
area of contract administration, however, the standards became
more complex. In Vaca v. Sipes,59 for example, the Court not only
reiterated the prohibition against hostile, discriminatory, or bad
faith conduct, but added two new prohibitions as well, against "ar-
bitrary" and "perfunctory" conduct.60 The Court's use of these
53. Id. at 570.
54. Id. at 571.
55. P. Simon, Still Crazy After All These Years, recorded on STILL CRAZY AFTER ALL THESE
YEARS. Courtesy and copyright 1975 Paul Simon. Published in the U.S.A. by Columbia
Records. All rights reserved.
56. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944).
57. Id. at 204.
58. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). For an excellent discussion
of the duty of fair representation in contract negotiations, see Finkin, supra note 12, at
193-236.
59. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
60. Id. at 177, 182, 190-94. The Court had first used the term "arbitrary" in an ear-
lier contract administration case, Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 350 (1964); Justice
Black's dissent in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 669 (1965), contained the
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terms indicated that a breach of the duty of fair representation
could be established by proving either that a union's conduct was
hostile, discriminatory, or in bad faith on the one hand, or that
the conduct was arbitrary or perfunctory on the other.'
Thus, the Supreme Court has defined the duty of fair repre-
sentation in terms that have been described at best as "very gen-
eral,"6 2 and more typically as "vague and imprecise" and a "vast
and confusing array of word-tests. ' 63 The greatest difficulty for
lower courts using this standard has come in their efforts to give
meaning to the terms "arbitrary" and "perfunctory." 4 For exam-
ple, most of the circuit courts claim adherance to the notion that
conduct which is merely negligent does not violate the duty of fair
representation, 5 but in a number of cases, courts have simply la-
beled what is essentially negligent conduct as arbitrary or perfunc-
tory. 6 A refreshing exception is Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor
first reference to "perfunctory" grievance handling.
61. See, e.g., Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190 ("[a] breach of the statutory duty of fair representa-
tion occurs only when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit
is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith" (emphasis added)); id. at 193 ("Owens could
not have established a breach of that duty merely by convincing the jury that he was in fact
fit for work in 1960; he must also have proved arbitrary or bad faith conduct on the part of
the Union in processing his grievance" (emphasis added)).
62. 0. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 1322.
63. NLRB MEMO, supra note 48.
64. Because two recent law review articles have collected these cases and made impres-
sive strides toward classifying them and proposing more sophisticated standards for evalu-
ating union conduct in grievance handling, no attempt to duplicate their efforts will be
made here. See Cheit, supra note 12; VanderVelde, supra note 12. Many recent cases are
also collected in C. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 1328-37. A less complicated approach, and
for that reason perhaps one ultimately more useful to the courts, was taken by Professor
Summers, who discussed seven paradigmatic hypothetical cases, and used them to develop
six "emerging principles of fair representation." Summers, supra note 12, at 278-80.
65. See, e.g., Dober v. Roadway Express, Inc. 707 F.2d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1983); Poole
v. Budd Co., 706 F.2d 181, 183 (6th Cir. 1983); Curtis v. United Transp. Union, 700 F.2d
457, 458 (8th Cir. 1983); Condon v. Local 2944, United Steelworkers, 683 F.2d 590, 594
(1st. Cir. 1982); Harris v. Schwerman Trucking Co., 668 F.2d 1204, 1206-07 (11th Cir.
1982); Findley v. Jones Motor Freight, 639 F.2d 953, 960 (3d Cir. 1981); Coe v. United
Rubber Workers, 571 F.2d 1349, 1350-51 (5th Cir. 1978). But see Dutrisac v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 749 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1983).
66. See, e.g., Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1089-91 (9th
Cir. 1978); Foust v. IBEW, 572 F.2d 710, 716 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442
U.S. 42 (1979); Schum v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 496 F.2d 328, 331-32 (2d Cir. 1974);
Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 184 (4th Cir. 1972); De Arroyo v. Sindicato De
Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 284-85 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877
(1970).
Indeed, in IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979), which held that punitive damages were
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Co.,617 in which the court acknowledged that the union's conduct
was simply negligent, but asserted that it was "more instructive to
compare the types of unintentional errors in union grievance
processing that usually are held to breach the duty" than to worry
about mere "labels." 8
Efforts to clarify the appropriate standard in duty of fair rep-
resentation cases have been further thwarted by dictum in a 1971
Supreme Court decision, Amalgamated Association of Motor Coach
Employees v. Lockridge,9 which has been totally disregarded in sub-
sequent Supreme Court opinions, but which continues to influ-
ence some lower courts.70 In this case, the Court stated that proof
of a breach of the duty of fair representation requires "substantial
not available in duty of fair representation cases, the four concurring justices noted (but
did not appear to be troubled by) the fact that the union's conduct in that case "betrayed
nothing more than negligence." Id. at 53 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See generally Note,
1BEW v. Foust: A Hint of Negligence in the Duty of Fair Representation, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1041
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, A Hint of Negligence]. Many commentators, of course,
have argued that negligent conduct should be explicitly recognized as constituting a breach
of the duty of fair representation. See, e.g., Dinges, Ruzicka v. General Motors: An Unlikely
Hero of the Trade Union Movement-The Individual Employee in a Section 301 Case Who Has
Been a Victim of Union Negligence, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 1773 (1978); Flynn & Higgins, Fair
Representation: A Survey of the Contemporary Framework and a Proposed Change in the Duty
Owed to the Employee, 8 SuFFoLK U.L. REv. 1096, 1143-51 (1974); Note, Determining Stan-
dards for a Union's Duty of Fair Representation: The Case for Ordinary Negligence, 65 CORNELL
L. REV. 634 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Case for Ordinary Negligence]. But see, e.g.,
Adomeit, Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight: Another Step In the Seemingly Inexorable March
Toward Converting Federal Judges (and Juries) Into Labor Arbitrators of Last Resort, 9 CONN. L.
REv. 627 (1977); Vladeck, supra note 10, at 45-54.
67. 749 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1983).
68. Id. at 1272-73. The plaintiff in Dutrisac was discharged for excessive absenteeism,
and he filed a grievance with his union claiming that his discharge was racially motivated in
violation of the collective bargaining agreement. A union official processed the grievance
through several steps of the grievance procedure. Then after the company refused to set-
tle, the union decided to take the grievance to arbitration. Unfortunately, through an inad-
vertent omission and with no ill will toward the plaintiff, the union made its request for
arbitration two weeks late, and the arbitrator ruled that the grievance was untimely and
therefore not arbitrable. In affirming the district court's summary judgment for the plain-
tiff, the court explained:
Most of the decisions finding 'simple negligence' insufficient to establish a
breach of the duty involve alleged errors in the union's evaluation of the merits
of a grievance .... When the challenged conduct is not an erroneous decision
by the union but its failure to perform a ministerial act required to carry out
the decision, courts have been more willing to impose liability for merely negli-
gent conduct.
Id. at 1273 (citations omitted).
69. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
70. See infra note 77.
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evidence of discrimination that is intentional, severe, and unre-
lated to legitimate union objectives.
'7 1
Lockridge, however, was a preemption case involving what was
essentially an action for tortious interference with an employment
relationship; it was not a hybrid section 301/fair representation
action,7 2 and the opinion contained no indication of any conscious
intent on the part of the Court to change the standards it had
announced earlier for establishing a breach of the duty. Indeed,
no subsequent Supreme Court decision has repeated the Lockridge
formulation of the standard; the Court has instead consistently re-
71. 403 U.S. at 301. The Court also quoted from Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335,
348 (1964), a pre-Vaca case, that there must be "substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful
action or dishonest conduct." 403 U.S. at 299. It should be noted, however, that the
Humphrey Court
did not limit its DFR analysis to a search for fraud, deceit, and dishonesty. Hav-
ing concluded that the union had displayed none of these three symptoms, it
proceeded to demonstrate that the union had acted 'in good faith and without
hostility or arbitrary discrimination,' and that it had made a rational decision
not based on 'capricious or arbitrary factors.'
Clark, supra note 12, at 1125 (citing Humphrey, 375 U.S. at 350). Moreover, the Lockridge
Court also referred to the "arbitrary or bad-faith conduct" standard of Vaca, 403 U.S. at
301 (emphasis added).
72. The union in Lockridge had procured the plaintiff's discharge pursuant to a valid
collectively bargained union security clause, because the union mistakenly believed that the
union constitution required the plaintiff's suspension from union membership for his fail-
ure to tender his union dues in a timely fashion. 403 U.S. at 277-80. The plaintiff sued the
union in state court, alleging that the union's conduct had wantonly and wilfully deprived
him of employment, and had violated the union's own constitution, which served as a con-
tract between the union and its members. Id. at 281-82. The Court held that the plaintiff's
action was preempted pursuant to San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236 (1959), because the union's alleged conduct was arguably prohibited by the National
Labor Relations Act. In doing so, however, the Court rejected arguments made for the
first time in plaintiff's Supreme Court brief that the union had violated its duty of fair
representation, explaining that the court below had treated the case as a simple contract
action and had not entertained any evidence concerning possible causes for the union's
alleged breach of contract. It was in this context that the Court inaccurately described the
standards for establishing a union's breach of the duty. Id. at 298-301. The Court's undue
emphasis on hostility and intentional discrimination in describing the standard can proba-
bly be explained by the fact that the plaintiff had argued that the union was hostile toward
him because he had obtained his release from the dues checkoff, and that the union had
departed from its own past practice by seeking his discharge for late payment of dues. Id.
at 280.
73. In the dissenting opinions, for example, "Justice Douglas quoted Vaca's tripartite
standard, and Justice White, the author of Vaca, cited its holding on preemption. But
neither of them suggested that the majority had modified Vaca's substantive theory in any
way." Clark, supra note 12, at 1126 (citing Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 307 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing), 329-30 (White, J., dissenting)).
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turned to language from Vaca v. Sipes.7 4 While most lower courts
and commentators agree that Lockridge did not modify the stan-
dards for evaluating union conduct,7 5 a number of courts have
mistakenly relied on Lockridge (perhaps in a backlash to the flirta-
tion of other courts with a negligence standard)" in holding that
only intentional or bad faith misconduct can constitute a breach
of the duty." Until Congress or the Supreme Court provides oth-
erwise, however, lower courts should follow the Supreme Court's
lead in recent cases and apply the Vaca standard, not the Lockridge
dictum.
C. The Procedural Framework
In the nine years since Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.,"8 all
five duty of fair representation cases to reach the Supreme Court
have involved procedural issues: the nature and allocation of
available monetary remedies,79 the appropriate statute of limita-
tions,80 and the exhaustion of internal union remedies.8 While
these cases are perhaps less fundamental to the doctrine's substan-
tive framework than the earlier cases, they have nevertheless had
a substantial impact on the outcome of duty of fair representation
74. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164 (1983)
(duty is breached when the union acts in "a discriminatory, dishonest, arbitrary, or per-
functory fashion" (emphasis added)); Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 693 n.24 (1981);
IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47 (1979); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S.
554, 568-69 (1976).
75. See, e.g., Ryan v. New York Newspaper Printing Pressman's Union No. 2, 590 F.2d
451, 456 (2d Cir. 1979); Foust v. IBEW, 572 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 442 U.S. 42 (1979); Beriault v. Local 40, ILWU, 501 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1974);
Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972); T. BOYCE, supra note 12, at 37-39; Cheit,
supra note 12, at 12 n.60; Clark, supra note 12, at 1124-26; Leffler, supra note 12, at 44-
45; VanderVelde, supra note 12, at 1097-98 n.54, 1117-18 n.1 14.
76. See, e.g., Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 749 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1983); Ru-
zicka v. General Motors, 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Ruzicka I].
77. See, e.g., Dober v. Roadway Express, Inc., 707 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983); Anderson
v. Airline Pilots, 650 F.2d 133 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1063 (1981); but see, e.g.,
Schultz v. Owens-Illinois Inc., 696 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982); Sanders v. Youthcraft Coats
and Suits, 700 F.2d 1226 (8th Cir. 1983).
78. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
79. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983); IBEW v. Foust, 442
U.S. 42 (1979).
80. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983); United Par-
cel Serv. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981).
81. Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679 (1981).
1985]
108 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
litigation."2
Hybrid section 301/fair representation cases can be brought
in either state or federal court, 3 although actions filed in state
court may be removed by defendants to federal court.8 4 Lower
courts are divided on the availability of jury trials in these cases,
but the current trend seems to favor them.8 5 Available remedies
have also been specified for the most part by the lower courts, and
include reinstatement or other injunctive relief, back pay and
other compensatory damages, and attorneys' fees.8"
In International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Foust,"'
however, the Supreme Court held that prevailing plaintiffs in duty
of fair representation cases cannot recover punitive damages from
82. See infra text accompanying notes 188 & 189.
83. Cf Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962)
(section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act does not deprive state courts of
jurisdiction).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982).
85. See, e.g., Smith v. Hussman Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229, 1244 (8th Cir. 1980)
(en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1981); Cox v. C.H. Masland & Sons, Inc., 607 F.2d
138, 143 (5th Cir. 1979); Minnis v. UAW, 531 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1975); Kinzel v. Allied
Supermarkets, Inc., 88 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Lucas v. Philco-Ford Corp., 380 F.
Supp. 139 (E.D. Pa. 1974). But see, e.g., James v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 109 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2858 (S.D. Miss. 1981); Davidson v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 96 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2808 (S.D. Ind. 1977).
86. See C. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 1347-54. Some commentators have argued that
where a union has wrongfully refused to process a grievance or take the grievance to arbi-
tration, the court should not rule on the underlying breach of contract claim, but should
simply order the union to process the grievance or take it to arbitration. See, e.g., Edwards,
A View From the Bench, in THE CHANGING LAW, supra note 8; Feller, supra note 14, at 813-
17. The Court in Vaca rejected this limitation on available remedies, however, for two
reasons. First, arbitrators usually have no authority to award relief against the union,
whose breach of the duty has probably increased the employee's losses. Vaca, 386 U.S. at
196. Second, in many cases, "the arbitrable issues may be substantially resolved in the
course of trying the fair representation controversy," and it would be unnecessarily expen-
sive and time consuming to require the plaintiff to prove his contract claim a second time
in arbitration. Id. Moreover, unions forced by court order to arbitrate grievances may do
so less than vigorously, both because of potential hostility toward the grievants who
brought suit against them, and because a victory in arbitration may expose them to in-
creased back pay liability due to the Supreme Court's decision in Bowen v. United States
Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, (1983). In any event, remanding to arbitration should never
entail remanding to joint labor-management grievance committees because of their vulner-
ability to abuse. See infra note 149. As one commentator has argued, "a court-ordered
arbitration will not afford effective protection to the plaintiff unless the court supervises
the arbitration, appoints the arbitrator, establishes ground rules that are equitable to all
three parties, insures that plaintiff's counsel will be paid for his representation, and retains
continuing jurisdiction over the case." Tobias, supra note 12, at 553.
87. 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
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defendant unions. The Court reasoned that the basic scheme of
federal labor policy has a compensatory and remedial, not puni-
tive, orientation.8 In addition, the Court was concerned that the
award of punitive damages "could deplete union treasuries,
thereby impairing the effectiveness of unions as collective-bargain-
ing agents. ' 81R It was also feared that the threat of punitive dam-
ages could undermine collectively bargained grievance procedures
because unions "might feel compelled to process frivolous claims
or resist fair settlements." 90
Unfortunately, in Bowen v. United States Postal Service,9 the
Court gave much less weight to these last two factors when it de-
cided how liability for damages should be apportioned between
unions and employers. The Court held that unions alone, as op-
posed to either employers alone or unions and employers jointly,
should be primarily liable for the portion of a discharged em-
ployee's back pay which accrues between the time a union
breaches the duty and the plaintiff's final recovery. Although the
dissent in Bowen is better reasoned, 92 the Court's decision is less
88. Id. at 49, 52. Punitive damages are not available from the NLRB as a remedy for
unfair labor practices, Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940), and most courts
have held that they are not available as a remedy for employment discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. E.g., EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301
(6th Cir. 1975). On the other hand, courts have held that punitive damages are available in
employment discrimination actions brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, §
16, 16 Stat. 144 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982)). E.g., Claiborne v. Illinois
Cent. R.R., 583 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934 (1979). Punitive dam-
ages are also available as a remedy for violations of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA). See, e.g., Quinn v. Digiulian, 739 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir.
1984); international Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 935 (1968). The Court in Foust expressly reserved judgment on the availability of
punitive damages under the LMRDA. Foust, 442 U.S. at 47 n.9.
89. Foust, 442 U.S. at 50-51.
90. Id. at 51-52.
91. 459 U.S. at 212.
92. The majority opinion was a dramatic departure from the well established practice,
previously sanctioned by the Court, of holding employers liable for 'all back pay,' while the
union would be liable only for the plaintiff's attorney's fees and other litigation costs. Id. at
231 n. 1, 232 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent correctly
noted that a union's breach of the duty in handling a discharge grievance "does not make
the discharge and the refusal to reinstate any less wrongful" on the part of the employer.
Id. at 238. As the dissent concluded, the Bowen decision "in effect reads an indemnification
provision into the collective bargaining *agreement, even though the employer can and
more properly should be required to bargain for such a provision, if desired." Id. at 240-
41. For an outstanding discussion of Bowen and the apportionment issue, see VanderVelde,
Making Good on Vaca's Promise: Apportioning Back Pay to Achieve Remedial Goals, 32 UCLA L.
110 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
devastating to unions than it first appears, because plaintiffs pre-
vail in so few duty of fair representation cases to begin withY3
Moreover, unions can reduce their exposure by negotiating griev-
ance procedures that permit employees to arbitrate some of their
own grievances at their own expense, 94 or that provide for the
union's indemnification by the employer for damages awarded as
a result of the union's breach. 95
The Supreme Court has twice in recent years addressed stat-
ute of limitations issues in section 301/duty of fair representation
cases.98 DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters97 was
the second of the two cases, made necessary in part to clear up the
confusion created by the first."' In DelCostello, the Court held that
REV. 302 (1984). See also Kirschner & Walfoort, The Duty of Fair Representation: Implications
of Bowen, 1 LAB. LAW. 19 (1985); Weingarten, Bowen v. United States Postal Service: The
Decision and its Effect on the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 35 LAB. LJ. 608 (1984).
93. See infra text accompanying note 172 (Table 15).
94. See Bowen, 459 U.S. at 225; Murray, Apportionment of Damages in Section 301 Duty of
Fair Representation Actions: The Impact of Bowen v. United States Postal Service, 32 DE PAUL
L. REv. 743, 780-83 (1983); Apportioning Damages in DFRI§301 Actions: Union Responses to
Bowen v. United States Postal Service, in AFL-CIO LAW. COORDINATING COMM., THE LABOR
LAW EXCHANGE 15-16 (No. 1, 1983) [hereinafter cited as AFL-CIO LAW.]. This is not a
drastic step. The Railway Labor Act, for example, permits employees whose union fails to
process their grievances to press it themselves. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i), (j) (1982). In this
respect, Bowen may lead to a reopening of the policy debate, seemingly resolved by Vaca,
over union versus individual employee control over the presentation of grievances. See
supra note 50.
95. See AFL-CIO LAW., supra note 94, at 16-18. Another alternative is for unions to
adopt a system of internal union review of alleged fair representation violations, coupled
with contractual provisions extending the time limits for invoking arbitration if the union
on reconsideration determines to do so. Id. at 15. Indeed, this proposal would also make
available to defendant unions in many duty of fair representation cases the defense of fail-
ure to exhaust internal union remedies. See infra text accompanying notes 101-103.
96. Section 301 contains no limitations period, but the Supreme Court had held in
UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966), that "the timeliness of a § 301 suit.
• . is to be determined, as a matter of federal law, by reference to the appropriate state
statute of limitations." Id. at 704-05.
Lower federal courts were split, however, on whether to adopt in hybrid fair represen-
tation cases the state limitations periods for tort actions, for contract actions, or for some
other state cause of action. See, e.g., Howard v. Aluminum Workers, 589 F.2d 771 (4th Cir.
1978) (tort); Butler v. Teamsters Local 823, 514 F.2d 442 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
924 (1975) (contract); Kaylor v. Crown Zellerbach, Inc., 643 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1981)
(statutorily created claims).
97. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
98. In United Parcel Serv. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981), the Court held that a §
301/fair representation suit challenging the decision of a Teamster joint grievance com-
mittee should be governed by the state limitations period for actions to vacate arbitration
awards, which in the case before the Court was 90 days. Unfortunately, Mitchell created
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the limitations period for filing both fair representation claims
against unions, and related breach of contract claims against em-
ployers, should be six months.9 The Court "borrowed" that limi-
tations period from section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations
Act, which requires unfair labor practice charges to be filed with
the National Labor Relation Board within six months.100
The last procedural issue to be resolved by the Supreme
Court in recent years was whether plaintiffs must exhaust internal
union remedies before initiating duty of fair* representation suits
against their unions or breach of contract actions against their
employers. In Clayton v. United Automobile Workers,"'1 the Court
held that "where an internal union appeals procedure cannot re-
sult in reactivation of the employee's grievance or an award of the
complete relief sought in his § 301 suit, exhaustion will not be
required with respect to either the suit against the employer or
the suit against the union." ' 2 Even where these conditions are
more uncertainty than it resolved. For example, it was unclear whether the designated
limitations period applied only to the action against the employer, or whether it applied to
the action against the union as well. It was also unclear whether it applied when the griev-
ance underlying the suit had not been taken through the final steps in the contractual
grievance procedure. Moreover, the decision was severely criticized for adopting too short
a limitations period. See, e.g., Klare, United Parcel Service v. Mitchell: Of Docket-Clearing
and Employee Rights, MAss. B.A. LAB. L. SEc. NEWS, November, 1981, at 1.
99. 462 U.S. at 155.
100. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982). The Court noted that it was not abandoning its gen-
eral practice of borrowing from analogous state statutes of limitations when federal statutes
contained no limitations periods, and was not overruling UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,
383 U.S. 696 (1966). DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171. See supra note 96. The Court explained
that hybrid § 301/duty of fair representation cases were a unique creation of federal labor
law, and that no state statutes of limitations were as closely analogous to, or effectuated
federal labor policy as well as, section 10(b) of the NLRA. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171.
Thus, without acknowledging that it was doing so, the Court in effect overruled United
Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981). DelCostello is silent regarding its applica-
tion to duty of fair representation suits under the Railway Labor Act, but lower courts
have held that it is applicable to such suits. See, e.g., Lindner v. Berg, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
3389 (Ist Cir. 1984); Welyecko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 512 (1984): Barnett v. United Air Lines, 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 594 (1984).
101. 451 U.S. 679 (1981).
102. Id. at 685. The plaintiff in Clayton alleged that he had been discharged without
cause by his employer, ITT Gilfillan. He filed a grievance, and his union processed it
through several steps of the collectively bargained grievance procedure. The union de-
cided, however, not to take the grievance to arbitration, and Clayton was notified of the
union's decision after the time for requesting arbitration under the contract had expired.
Clayton filed his lawsuit without first pursuing the internal union appeals procedures estab-
lished under the United Auto Workers' constitution. Id. at 682-83. Justice Brennan's opin-
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met, exhaustion will not be required if there is evidence of union
hostility toward the grievant which would make a fair hearing un-
likely, or if exhaustion would "unreasonably delay the employee's
opportunity to obtain a judicial hearing on the merits of his
claim." 103
II. THE METHODOLOGY OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
In order to determine the characteristics and the outcomes of
duty of fair representation litigation in the courts, data for this
study were collected in three ways. First, my research assistants
and I surveyed and catalogued information from all the duty of
fair representation cases which generated published federal court
opinions between 1977 and 1983. Second, we read and catalogued
information from the courthouse files of all the duty of fair repre-
sentation cases filed in three federal district courts during most of
that same time period. Finally, we conducted a mail and telephone
survey of the attorneys involved in the cases identified through
the courthouse files.
ion for a five member majority held that Clayton's failure to exhaust his internal union
remedies did not bar his suit, because the union appeals procedures could "neither rein-
state Clayton in his job .... nor reactivate his grievance." Id. at 691, 696. The Court
"decline[di to impose a universal exhaustion requirement lest employees with meritorious
§ 301 claims be forced to exhaust themselves and their resources by submitting their claims
to potentially lengthy internal union procedures that may not be adequate to redress their
underlying grievances." Id. at 689.
103. Id. The Court was silent on the issue of which party has the burden of demon-
strating the propriety (or impropriety) of requiring exhaustion in a given case, but it would
seem that the burden should be borne by the defendants-"the parties who not only profit
from [the exhaustion defense] but also possess virtually all the relevant information." Fox
& Sonenthal, supra note 12, at 1028. See also Note, Exhaustion of Intraunion Remedies Doc-
trine: The Lower Federal Courts' Application of Clayton v. UAW, 8 J. CORP. L. 389, 403
(1983).
Another issue left open by the Court in Clayton is the length of time the grievant must
spend exhausting internal remedies, where exhaustion is appropriate. The Court's concern
that exhaustion not "unreasonably delay" a plaintiff's day in court, 451 U.S. at 689, would
suggest that grievants not be required to spend endless months, or even years, exhausting
internal union remedies. The final remedy under some union constitutions is appeal to the
union's national convention, which may be held at intervals as long as five years apart, See
Fox & Sonenthal, supra note 12, at 997. Indeed, even the dissenters in Clayton, who would
have imposed exhaustion requirements even where union remedies could not award com-
plete relief, would have adopted the four month limit on exhaustion contained in section
101(a)(4) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 41 1(a)(4)
(1982). Clayton, 451 U.S. at 702-03 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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A. The Published Opinions
1977 was chosen as the starting point for this study because
that was the first full year following the Supreme Court's decision
in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight.04 Hines is an important milestone
in duty of fair representation litigation because it answered in the
affirmative a question the Court had left open nine years earlier in
Vaca v. Sipes:105 whether employees could utilize the cause of ac-
tion to challenge the resolution of grievances that had been taken
all the way through the arbitration process.10 6
The cases to be surveyed were identified by means of a list
generated on LEXS.107 Although we began with a list of 1283 ci-
tations,10 8 almost forty percent of those opinions were eliminated
by the conclusion of the study, leaving 809 cases in the survey.
The opinions eliminated fell into four categories: (1) opinions con-
taining the words "fair representation" but which were not in fact
duty of fair representation cases; (2) opinions in cases originating
before the National Labor Relations Board;10 9 (3) cases involving
public sector labor relations governed by state law; 0 and (4) addi-
tional opinions in cases already included in the survey.1 As each
case was read, a survey form was completed1 2 and the data gath-
ered were subsequently coded and entered into a computer for
104. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
105. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
107. The search request was "fair representation," Labor library, Courts file.
108. The great majority of these opinions were published by the West Publishing
Company or one of the two principal labor law looseleaf services (BNA or CCH), but 144
of the citations were to apparently unpublished slip opinions. We included these slip opin-
ions in the survey if otherwise within the scope of the study.
109. Gases involving the NLRB were excluded from this study because the procedural
aspects of those cases, the parties involved, the remedies available, and indeed the body of
law applied are so different from those in duty of fair representation suits initiated in the
courts by private litigants that to include them would be mixing apples with oranges. See
supra text accompanying note 48.
110. Public sector cases governed by federal law were included in the survey.
S111. Many cases generated more than one published opinion during the period cov-
ered by this study. In such cases, we used only the most recent published opinion in order
to avoid the problem of overcounting the factors we were examining. For example, in the
well-known Ruzicka litigation, see, e.g., VanderVelde, supra note 12, at 1083-84 n. 11, which
generated four published opinions during the period covered by this study and ten overall,
we used Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 707 F.2d 259 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
982 (1983).




B. The Courthouse Cases
A survey based solely on published opinions, of course, can
yield a picture of only the tip of the litigation iceberg, and as with
real icebergs, it is difficult to know how closely that tip resembles
the shape of things lying beneath the surface.113 Published opin-
ions, for example, often involve interlocutory issues and may pro-
vide no clue as to which party ultimately prevailed in the litigation
and on what grounds. Moreover, in most types of litigation, over
fifty percent of the cases settle out of court.114 Published opinions
can obviously reveal little about the patterns of such settlements.
For these reasons, our examination of duty of fair representation
litigation included the files of federal courthouses.
The duty of fair representation cases in three federal district
courts were chosen for examination: The Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, the Southern District of New York, and the District
of Maryland.1 15 In part, these districts were chosen because of
their geographic accessibility, but they were chosen for other rea-
sons as well. Each district is in a different federal circuit, so the
law governing the cases studied is somewhat more representative
than if all the districts were in the same circuit. 1 ' Moreover, all
three districts are among the top twelve in volume of duty of fair
representation litigation, as measured by the number of cases gen-
erating published opinions.11
The names and docket numbers of the case files to be ex-
amined were compiled from lists of all the cases classified as Labor
Management Relations Act or Railway Labor Act cases and filed
in each district from 1977 through 1982.118 Many of the cases on
113. For a discussion of the problems in relying on published opinions as a basis for
empirical studies of the law, see Cartwright, Disputes and Reported Cases, 9 LAW & Soc'Y
REv. 369 (1975).
114. Trubek, supra note 18, at 89.
115. Limited resources precluded a more extensive survey.
116. Compare, e.g., Medlin v. Boeing Vertol Co., 620 F.2d 957, 961 (3d Cir. 1980)
(requiring bad faith to establish a breach of the duty) with Wyatt v. Interstate & Ocean
Transp. Co., 623 F.2d 888, 891 (4th Cir. 1980) (grossly deficient conduct can constitute a
breach of the duty).
117. See infra text accompanying note 128 (Table 5).
118. These lists were based on information supplied on the "civil cover sheets" which
are filed with the court whenever a new action is initiated in federal district court. The
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these lists, of course, did not involve duty of fair representation
claims, and were eliminated from the survey. Those that did com-
prised nearly all of the duty of fair representation actions filed in
these three districts during the period covered. Given the impreci-
sion with which federal courts classify their cases, however, the
survey probably missed a number of cases in which the principal
claims were based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964119
or on the Landrum-Griffin Act,12 but which also contained sec-
ondary duty of fair representation claims. There is no way of
identifying such cases short of examining the pleadings in every
Title VII or Landrum-Griffin Act case, which was not done. It is
safe to say, however, that we examined nearly every case in which
the litigants considered the duty of fair representation claims to
be primary.121
A total of 188 duty of fair representation case files were ex-
amined: 101 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; forty-five in
the Southern District of New York; and forty-two in the District
of Maryland. As with the published opinions, a survey form was
completed as each case file was examined, and the data collected
were coded and entered into a computer for analysis.1 2
2
C. The Attorney Survey
The final means of gathering data for this study was a mail
and telephone survey of the attorneys involved in the duty of fair
representation cases identified through the courthouse research
described in the preceeding subsection. Our primary purpose in
Clerk's office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had this material available on micro-
fiche for all the years covered by the study, and the Clerk's office for the Southern District
of New York had the material available for some of the years covered. The remaining lists
of cases for the Southern District of New York, and all the lists for the District of Mary-
land, were obtained from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
119. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982) (prohibiting employment discrimination
based on race, sex, religiori, or national origin).
120. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982) (regulating the internal affairs of unions and requir-
ing unions to meet minimal standards of union democracy).
121. The attorney survey revealed that defense attorneys in duty of fair representa-
tion cases almost always remove such cases to federal court when filed initially in state
court. See infra text accompanying note 133. Thus, most fair representation cases filed even
in the state courts within these federal districts were probably included in the study. There
were a handful of cases, however, in which the court records were misfiled or otherwise
unavailable.
122. The survey form that was used is reproduced in the appendix to this Article.
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conducting the attorney survey was to obtain information about
the ultimate outcome of cases that settled out of court. The last
docket entry for 35.6% of the cases in courthouse files was "stipu-
lated dismissal," or something to that effect,123 yet the court
records rarely described the terms of the settlements agreed to by
the parties. The attorney survey also sought information about
each attorney's experience with duty of fair representation litiga-
tion in general.
Attorneys' names and addresses were obtained from the
courthouse files, and where necessary, addresses were updated
through telephone and bar directories. Questionnaires were
mailed to all the attorneys for whom addresses could be obtained,
and follow-up telephone interviews were conducted with many at-
torneys who failed to respond to the mail survey. Responses were
ultimately obtained from at least one attorney involved in each of
116, or 61.7%, of the courthouse cases. These responses provided
information about the settlements reached in 73.1% of the cases
resolved through out-of-court settlements.
III. THE FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
A. The Volume and Location of DFR Litigation
If commentators agree on anything concerning duty of fair
representation litigation, it is that the number of such cases has
been increasing rapidly in recent years."2 Table 1 presents the
number of duty of fair representation opinions published per year
between 1977 and 1983. The figures indicate an increase in the
number of such opinions of 150% over that span.
123. See infra text accompanying note 172 (Table 15).
124. For example, almost every speaker at a recent conference on the duty of fair















These figures certainly indicate a dramatic increase, but it
must be noted that this increase' in the number of opinions pub-
lished does not necessarily imply that the number of cases filed
has increased at the same rate. It might instead reflect the high
state of flux and uncertainty in the controlling law, to which
judges respond by writing and publishing more opinions. For ex-
ample, one of the most unstable areas of the law controlling duty
of fair representation litigation during the period covered by this
study involved the determination of the appropriate statute of lim-
itations; 126 fully 26.2% of all the opinions surveyed addressed this
issue, ranging from 8.5% of the opinions published in 1977 to an
amazing 46.7% of the opinions published in 1983.
In this regard, the figures in Table 2 are quite interesting,
because they show that the number of duty of fair representation
cases actually filed in the three district courts covered by the
courthouse survey remained fairly constant, in fact dropping
slightly, between 1977 and 1982. It must be noted, however, as a
comparison of the figures in Table 1 and Table 3 indicates, that
the number of published opinions issued by these three district
courts increased at a slower rate than that for all district courts.
Nevertheless, the evidence does suggest that duty of fair represen-
tation litigation may not be increasing at quite the alarming rate
that the number of published opinions alone might indicate. In-
125. The figures in this Table were compiled using only one published opinion-the
most recent-for' cases generating more than one. See supra note 111.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 96-100.
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deed, a comparison of the figures in Tables 2 and 4 suggests that
duty of fair representation litigation may be growing at a much
slower rate than other civil litigation in the federal courts.
TABLE 2
DFR CASES FILED PER YEAR
IN THREE DISTRICT COURTS
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The geographic distribution of duty of fair representation liti-
gation may be seen in Table 5, which provides the number of
published opinions per federal district court. As one might expect,
these cases seem to be concentrated in the highly unionized north-
east and upper midwest, and appear with less frequency in the less
unionized south and west.
127. This table was compiled from statistics collected by the Director of the Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts. See Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial
Conference of the United States for 1982 at 94; for 1981 at 201; for 1980 at 218-19; for
1979 at 214-15; and for 1977 at 192. Yearly figures are for the twelve month period end-

















































less than 1 each
B. The Parties Involved
It is now well settled that in most situations, plaintiffs in duty
of fair representation litigation are free to sue both the employer
and the union together in one suit, or to sue each separately in
two lawsuits, or to sue only one or the other in a single action.1 20
128. The Northern District of Illinois is probably somewhat overrepresented in this
table because an unusually high number of otherwise unpublished slip opinions from this
district found their way into the Lexis database. For example, 27 of the 40 slip opinions
contained on the Lexis list of citations for 1983, or 67.5%, were from the Northern District
of Illinois.
129. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184-88 (1967); Kaiser v. Teamsters Local 83, 577
F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1978). Often, plaintiffs choose for political reasons not to sue their
unions. See, e.g., Gibbs, DFR Actions Must Be Carefully Evaluated, LABOR UPDATE, May 1981,
District
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The figures in Table 6 indicate, however, that in the overwhelm-
ing majority of cases, both the union and employer are named as
defendants in a single action, sometimes along with other
defendants.130
TABLE 6
PARTIES NAMED AS DEFENDANTS
Published Opinions Courthouse Cases
Party Number Percent Number Percent
Employer only 41 5.1 15 8.0
Union only 61 7.5 17 9.0
Both 606 74.9 120 63.8
Employer & other 2 0.3 2 1.1
Union & other 26 3.2 4 2.1
Both & other 73 9.0 30 16.0
at 8; Levy, The DFR Is a Valuable Arrow for the Rank and File Quiver, LABOR UPDATE, May
1981, at 9 (Labor Update is the newsletter of the labor law committee of the National Law-
yers Guild). Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bowen v. United States
Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983), may make that an expensive option for some plaintiffs,
who will have to choose between suing their unions or foregoing some of their back pay.
See supra text accompanying notes 91-95.
Some types of duty of fair representation claims, it should be noted, do not involve any
alleged contract violations on the part of the employer at all, and in such cases, obviously,
the employer would not be named as a defendant. This is often the case in suits alleging
some form of discrimination or favoritism in the administration of union-run hiring halls.
See, e.g., Emmanuel v. Omaha Carpenters Dist. Council, 535 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1976).
130. The other defendants most often sued include individual union officers and indi-
vidual supervisors or other agents of the employer. The union entity most frequently sued
is the local, which usually has primary responsibility for grievance handling. Plaintiffs will
sometimes sue their international union or other subdivisions of their union as well. For
purposes of Table 6, these additional union defendants were classified as "union," not
"other" defendants. Union defendants other than locals, however, are frequently dismissed
from the proceedings on the grounds that they were not directly involved in the alleged
breach of the duty on the part of the local and cannot be held vicariously liable. See, e.g.,
Baker v. Newspaper & Graphic Communications Local 6, 628 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1980); Teamsters Local 30 v.
Helms Express, Inc., 591 F.2d 211 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 837 (1979); but cf. Kirk-
land v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 629 F.2d 538 (8th Cir. 1980), (although an inter-
national union does not owe a personal duty of fair representation to a member of a local
union, the member at least has the right to insist that procedural safeguards imposed by
the international union be observed), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 980 (1981); Warner v. McLean
Trucking Co., 574 F. Supp. 291 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (inclusion of other defendants upheld
because this was "not wholly a dispute between a union and its members").
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Duty of fair representation suits are sometimes brought as
class actions,'13 1 and the courthouse survey revealed that fifteen of
the 188 cases in the three districts studied, or eight percent, were
brought as class actions, although classes were actually certified in
only two of those cases .' 2 No effort was made to determine how
many of the published opinions involved class actions, because
opinions addressing issues other than class certification may have
had no reason to mention that the case was in fact brought as a
class action, and the danger of undercounting such cases was be-
lieved to be too great.
The courthouse survey also revealed that about one-third of
the duty of fair representation cases in the three federal districts
studied were originally filed in state court but were removed to
federal court by defendants. 33
Table 7 indicates the number of cases per international or na-
tional union in which that union, or one of its locals, was charged
with a breach of the duty of fair representation. An immediately
striking statistic from this table is that nearly one-third of all the
cases involved a single union, the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters. Moreover, only four unions accounted for over fifty
percent of the total number of cases. Also noteworthy is the fact
that the Airline Pilots Association, a relatively small union, 134
ranked sixth on the list, and that a number of large unions not
known for the quality of their internal democracy, such as the La-
borers Union,' 35 ranked relatively low on the list.
131. See, e.g., Smith v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 473 F. Supp. 572 (D. Md. 1979); Buch-
holtz v. Swift & Co., 62 F.R.D. 581 (D. Minn. 1973).
132. These figures may somewhat undercount class actions, however, because the
courthouse survey probably missed a number of Title VII class actions that also involved
duty of fair representation claims. See supra text accompanying note 119.
133. State and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over cases based on section
301. See Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 101 (1962). An overwhelm-
ing number of the defense attorneys who responded to our attorney survey, or 96.6%,
have a general policy of removing to federal court any duty of fair representation cases
filed against their clients in state court, assuming the cases are removable.
134. The Airline Pilots Association, including its flight attendant and other airline
employee divisions, has approximately 59,000 members. DIRECTORY OF U.S. LABOR ORGANi-
ZATIONS 15-16 (C. Gifford ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as U.S. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS].





NUMBER OF PUBLISHED OPINIONS PER UNION 13 6
Union Number Percent
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters 238 29.4
United Auto Workers 84 10.4
United Steelworkers 51 6.3
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists 38 4.7
United Food & Commercial Workers 32 4.0
Airline Pilots Ass'n 27 3.3
Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers 20 2.5
United Transportation Workers 19 2.4
Bhd. of Railway & Airline Clerks 13 1.6
Communication Workers of America 13 1.6
Am. Postal Workers Union 12 1.5
Bakery & Confectionary Workers 10 1.2
United Bhd. of Carpenters 10 1.2
Amalgamated Transit Union 9 1.1
Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers 8 1.0
United Ass'n of Plumbers & Pipefitters 8 1.0
United Rubber Workers 8 1.0
63 Unions 1-7 less than 1
34 Unions not identified - 4.2
The figures in Table 7 invite speculation. Certainly a union's
size is a major variable; one would expect larger unions to be in-
volved in more duty of fair representation cases than smaller un-
ions. 137 Table 8, however, demonstrates that size is not the only
136. This table represents the number of cases in which each union was implicated.
The unions were not necessarily named as defendants in each case, although unions were
named as defendants in 94.6% of the cases. See supra text accompanying note 130 (Table
6). The United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW) resulted from the 1979
merger of the Retail Clerks and the Meat Cutters Unions. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS,
LAB. REL Y.B.-1979 235 (1980). The figures in this table referring to the UFCW include
the pre-merger cases involving the Retail Clerks and the Meat Cutters.
The unions implicated in the courthouse cases are not included because geographical
factors would have distorted the results. For example, the east and gulf coast longshore-
men (the International Longshoremen's Association) would have been overrepresented,
while the west coast longshoremen (the International Longshoremen's and Warehouse-
men's Union) would have been underrepresented.
137. On the other hand, very small unions may be particularly vulnerable to duty of
fair representation litigation because their limited resources may preclude them from tak-
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
factor. It ranks by size the ten largest, predominantly private sec-
tor, labor unions and provides the percentage that each union's
membership comprises of the total unionized, private sector
workforce. A comparison of the figures in Table 8 with those in
Table 7 indicates that the Teamsters, for example, are involved in
more than triple the number of duty of fair representation cases
than their size alone would suggest, and that the United Automo-
bile Workers (UAW) are involved in almost seventy percent more.
TABLE 8
THE TEN LARGEST PRIVATE SECTOR UNIONS, AND
THEIR RESPECTIVE PERCENTAGES OF THE
UNIONIZED, PRIVATE SECTOR WORKFORCE 38
Number of
Union Members Percent
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters 1,891,000 8.6
United Auto Workers 1,357,000 6.2
United Food & Commercial Workers 1,300,000 5.9
United Steelworkers 1,238,000 5.6
Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers 1,041,000 4.7
United Bhd. of Carpenters 784,000 3.6
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists 754,000 3.4
Service Employees Int'l 650,000 3.0
Laborers Int'l 608,000 2.8
Communication Workers of Am. 551,000 2.5
A variety of factors may explain these disparities between a
union's size and its involvement in duty of fair representation liti-
gation. Unemployment levels and the general health of the partic-
ular union's industry may be factors. In industries-or regions of
the country-where jobs are plentiful, discharged employees who
can readily find new work would be less inclined to bring lawsuits
to regain their old jobs than would workers in declining industries
or areas of high unemployment.3 9 Moreover, industries undergo-
ing many meritorious grievances to arbitration or trom otherwise representing their mem-
bers properly.
138. Compiled from statistics provided in US. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 134,
at 1, 2, 4 (based on 1980 figures).
139. Not only would the potential plaintiff have less incentive to sue, but so would the
potential plaintiffs lawyer. Duty of fair representation cases are frequently handled on a
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ing major structural changes, such as the trucking and airline in-
dustries (due to the effects of deregulation), are likely to generate
increased numbers of grievances involving layoffs, loss of senior-
ity, and changes in working conditions; 140 more grievances may
result in more unhappy grievants, which may ultimately lead to
the filing of more duty of fair representation cases. Furthermore,
discharges in some industries are simply not the traumatic events
they are in most. For example, construction workers and long-
shoremen typically work on jobs of short duration obtained
through union-run hiring halls, and are more likely to take in
stride the loss of one particular job. In addition, when violations
of the duty of fair representation occur in the administration of
the hiring hall, remedies may be more easily obtained through the
National Labor Relations Board than through the courts.
14'
Finally, the characteristics of the unions and their members
must be considered. The UAW, for example, has a reputation for
taking a very hard line towards settling these cases, so as not to
encourage plaintiffs to sue.1 42 This policy undoubtedly generates
published opinions for cases other unions might have settled. The
UAW also litigates most heavily the defense of failure to exhaust
internal union remedies, which has generated a large number of
published opinions in recent years. 43 Some unions, such as the
contingency basis, and if lost wages can be easily mitigated, the amount of the plaintiff's
recovery, and therefore the attorney's fee, would be reduced. Tobias, supra note 12 at 546.
140. See generally Arouca & Perritt, Transportation Labor Law and Policy for a Deregu-
lated Industry, 1 LAB. LAW. 617 (1985); Flexner, The Effect of Deregulation in the Motor Carrier
Industry, 28 ANTrrRusT BULL. 185 (1983); Jansonius & Broughton, Coping with Deregulation:
Reduction of Labor Costs in the Airline Industry, 49 J. AIR L. & COMMERCE 501 (1984).
141. Unlike many duty of fair representation claims which involve alleged wrongful
conduct on the part of the employer as well as the union, and for which complete relief is
therefore not available through the NLRB, see supra note 48, hiring hall violations fre-
quently involve only union misconduct which can be fully remedied through NLRB pro-
ceedings. See C. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 1396-1406; Bastress, Application of a Constitution-
ally-based Duty of Fair Representation to Union Hiring Halls, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 31 (1979).
142. Such behavior is not uncommon among institutional "repeat players" who en-
gage in frequent litigation of a given type. See Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'y REv. 95 (1974).
143. Of the published opinions addressing this defense, a disproportionately high
33.8% involved the UAW. Thus, it is not surprising to find that the UAW was a party in
the one Supreme Court case involving this issue. Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679 (1981).
The UAW's interest in this defense may be related to the fact that it utilizes an outside
public review board to hear complaints of internal union misconduct. This makes the
UAW one of the few unions with internal remedies which can be expected to operate in a
reasonably unbiased manner. On the other hand, the UAW's public review board applies a
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Airline Pilots Association, are comprised for the most part of well
educated and well paid members, who may be more apt to sue
because of their sophistication and level of financial resources;
other unions, on the other hand, such as the Laborers, are gener-
ally comprised of lower paid, less well educated workers who may
be less likely to seek out an attorney and file a lawsuit.
1 44
A number of different factors may be at work within the
Teamsters Union. First, deregulation and the recent recession
have caused tremendous upheaval and brought hard times upon
the trucking industry.14 5 Second, while Teamsters may not neces-
sarily be better educated than the average employee, their in-
comes are often higher than most other blue collar workers.1 40
Third, many Teamster collective bargaining agreements, particu-
larly in the trucking and warehouse industries, establish joint
union-management grievance committees to resolve grievances in-
stead of other, more traditional types of arbitration. 47 These
joint committees, comprised of an equal number of union and
management representatives without a neutral outsider to break
ties, operate in a manner that makes it particularly easy for union
officials so inclined to violate their duty of fair representation by
"horsetrading" grievances, 48 or seeing to it that unpopular or
more deferential standard than that used by most courts in evaluating charges against the
union, and over the course of 20 years, it only once found that the union had breached its
duty in grievance handling. Klein, Enforcement of the Right to Fair Representation: Alternative
Forums, in THE DUTY OF FAr REPRESENTATION, supra note 10, at 97, 103.
144. See Hallauer, Low Income Laborers as Legal Clients: Use Patterns and Attitudes To-
ward Lawyers, 49 DEN. L.J. 169 (1972); Hoyman & Stallworth, Who Files Suits and Why: An
Empirical Portrait of the Litigious Worker, 1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 115, 127-28, 131-32.
145. See supra note 140, and accompanying text.
146. This tends to be the case among Teamsters in the trucking and warehousing
industries. Many Teamsters in other industries, however, are not nearly as well paid. For
example, cannery workers under Teamster contracts in California typically earn about
$6.00 to $8.00 per hour, whereas truck drivers and warehouse workers under the Central
States Supplement to the National Master Freight Agreement typically earn about $13.40
per hour. Telephone interview with Ken Paff, Organizer for Teamsters for a Democratic
Union (Feb. 18, 1985).
147. Id.
148. Most courts and commentators agree that the trading of a meritorious griev-
ance-especially in a discharge case-for the benefit of another individual or the group
violates the duty of fair representation. On the other hand, foregoing a weak grievance in
exchange for an employer concession, at least when not motivated by hostility or bad faith,
does not violate the duty. See, e.g., Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558 (4th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976); Local 13, Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehouse-
men's Union v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 441 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
126 [Vol. 34
FAIR REPRESENTATION
dissident members lose their grievances. 49 A fourth major factor
is the unfortunate reality that the Teamsters Union is among the
most corrupt and autocratic of major American unions. 50 Finally,
the presence within the union of a well established, national oppo-
sition caucus, Teamsters for a Democratic Union (TDU), is an im-
portant factor. TDU plays a major role both in educating rank
1016 (1971); Simberland v. Long Island R.R., 421 F.2d 1219 (2d Cir. 1970); Miller v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2871 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Clark, supra note 12, at
1174-77; Leffler, supra note 12, at 58-60; Summers, supra note 12, at 270-73, 279; Van-
derVelde, supra note 12, at 1150-53.
149. Professor Summers' penetrating description of how Teamster joint committees
operate identifies a number of factors which make joint committees particularly vulnerable
to abuse: (1) the hearing frequently does not provide an adequate opportunity to present
relevant evidence; (2) extensive ex parte discussions frequently occur between panel mem-
bers and parties interested in the outcome of pending grievances; (3) the hearing process
facilitates the trading of grievances under the guise of adjudication; (4) union representa-
tives on grievance panels are susceptible to political pressure from the union hierarchy; (5)
the panels are inherently lacking in neutrality, and panel members often have an indirect
interest in the outcome of particular grievances; (6) joint committee decisions rarely have
precedential value in later cases, so like cases need not be decided in a like manner; (7)
joint committee decisions are rarely accompanied by a statement of the committee's rea-
soning or a description of the facts before it; and (8) there is no readily available record of
the proceedings. Summers, Teamster Joint Grievance Committees: Grievance Disposal Without
Adjudication, in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 37TH ANNUAL
MEETING 130 (1984). See also Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 615 F.2d 1194,
1201 (8th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 450 U.S. 728 (1981); General Drivers v. Young
& Hay Transp. Co., 522 F.2d 562, 567 n.5 (8th Cir. 1975); R. JAMES & E. JAMES, HOFFA
AND THE TEAMSTERS 167-85 (1965); Azoff, Joint Committees As An Alternative Form of Arbitra-
tion Under the NLRA, 47 TuL L. REv. 325 (1973); Clark, supra note 12, at 1169-71; Feller,
supra note 14, at 836-38.
Even when they function properly, joint committees are likely to present the appear-
ance of impropriety, since the only way a grievant can lose before a joint committee is for
one of the union representatives on the committee to vote against the grievant. In the
event that the committee is deadlocked, the grievance usually proceeds to another joint
committee comprised of higher level union and management officials. The appearance of
impropriety inherent in these committees plausibly invites litigation. See Hoyman & Stall-
worth, supra note 144, at 132.
150. See, e.g., S. BRILL, THE TEAMSTERS (1978); D. MOLDEA, THE HOFFA WARS (1978);
PROFESSIONAL DRIVERS COUNCIL, TEAMSTER DEMOCRACY AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY A
FINANCIAL AND STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS (1976); and almost any issue of Convoy Dispatch, the
monthly newspaper of Teamsters for a Democratic Union. It should not be surprising that
a union whose leaders are frequently convicted for labor racketeering and other crimes is a
target for many duty of fair representation suits. See Hoyman & Stallworth, supra note 144,
at 132-34. Three of the last five presidents of the Teamsters-Dave Beck, Jimmy Hoffa,
and Roy Williams-were convicted of federal crimes while in office. According to the Sen-
ate Labor Committee, 49 Teamster officials were convicted of various types of labor racke-
teering between January of 1980 and June of 1983.Jackie Presser in the Hot Seat, NEwswEEK,
Aug. 20, 1984, at 57-61.
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and file Teamsters about their legal rights, and in assisting them
to obtain the services of attorneys when those rights have been
violated.151
C. The Nature of the Claims
A distinction is generally made between a union's duty of fair
representation in negotiating a collective bargaining agreement
on the one hand, and in administering it, or handling grievances
under it, on the other."' Table 9 demonstrates that in approxi-
mately eighty percent of the published opinions and ninety per-
cent of the cases in courthouse files, the alleged breach of the
union's duty occurred in grievance handling, whereas breaches of
the duty in contract negotiations were alleged in only about
12.5% and 7.5% of these cases, respectively. Of the breaches al-
leged in grievance handling, a substantial majority took place
before arbitration, reflecting in part the large number of alleged
breaches resulting from union decisions not to file or process
grievances, or take grievances to arbitration.153 But note that of
the published cases alleging union misconduct at the final stage of
the grievance procedure, 66.2% involved the Teamsters, and of
those cases, fully 84.9% involved joint union-management griev-
ance committees.Y5
151. For example, the Teamsters for a Democratic Union published a 312 page legal
rights handbook for its members. E. BOAL, TEAMSTER RANK AND FiLE LEGAL RIGHTS HAND-
BOOK (rev. ed. 1984). See generally S. BRILL, supra note 150, at 312-20; S. FRIEDMAN, TEAM-
STER RANK AND FILE 209-43 (1982); Benson, Reform Among the Teamsters, 26 DISSENT 153
(1979).
152. See, e.g., Blumrosen, supra note 50; Lefiler, supra note 12; Summers, supra note
12, at 254-58.
153. See infra text accompanying note 160 (Table 11).
154. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. It is not surprising that Hines v.
Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554 (1976), in which the Court extended the duty of fair
representation doctrine to cases in which the underlying grievance had been taken through
arbitration, involved a Teamster joint committee.
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TABLE 9
LOCUS OF ALLEGED UNION MISCONDUCT 155
Published Opinions Courthouse Cases
Locus Number Percent Number Percent
In negotiating or
ratifying contract 101 12.5 14 7.5
In grievance handling
before arbitration 463 57.2 133 70.7
In grievance handling
at or after arbitration 190 23.4 37 19.7
Other locus1 56  83 10.3 13 6.9
Unknown or
none alleged 64 7.9 8 4.3
Tables 10 and 11 provide a more detailed breakdown of the
types of union misconduct alleged in contract negotiation and
grievance handling cases. Table 10 indicates that in cases involv-
ing contract negotiation, the nature of the alleged wrong is much
more likely to concern the substantive terms of the contract than
the manner in which it was negotiated or ratified. This result is
not surprising in light of the very limited legal recognition given
to the importance of procedural democracy in the collective bar-
gaining process. 157 Although alleged wrongful conduct in griev-
ance handling is widely disbursed over a variety of different types,
as indicated in Table 11, one particular category is surprisingly
underrepresented: negligently missing a filing deadline. This is
noteworthy because, given the attention this type of wrongful con-
duct has received from commentators, one would have thought
the courts were swamped by such claims. 58
155. The percent columns in this table each total more than 100% because in a num-
ber of cases, plaintiffs alleged union misconduct in two or more loci.
156. Examples of this "other locus" category include the administration of union-run
hiring halls and the union's discipline of its members.
157. For a thorough and enlightening discussion of this shortcoming in American la-
bor law, see Hyde, Democracy in Collective Bargaining, 93 YALE L.J. 793 (1984). See also
Finkin, supra note 12; Silverstein, Union Decisions on Collective Bargaining Goals: A Proposal
for Interest Group Participation, 77 MicH. L. REv. 1485 (1979).
158. See, e.g., Cheit, supra note 12; VanderVelde, supra note 12; Note, A Hint of Negli-
gence, supra note 66. In fairness to the commentators, it should be noted that allegations of
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this type were present in several important cases. See, e.g., IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42
(1979); Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1981); Ruzicka v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 528 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1975).
159. The figures in the percent columns of this table represent the percentages of
cases in which misconduct in contract negotiations was alleged, not the percentages of all
cases. The percentages for the published opinions total more than 100% because in a num-
ber of cases alleging union misconduct in contract negotiations, plaintiffs also alleged mis-




NATURE OF ALLEGED UNION MISCONDUCT IN
GRIEVANCE HANDLING 60
Type of Misconduct














































160. The figures in the percent columns of this table represent the percentages of
cases in which misconduct in grievance handling was alleged, not the percentages of all
cases. The percent columns each total more than 100% because in a number of cases alleg-




Separating contract negotiation cases from grievance han-
dling cases is only one means of classification. Another equally sig-
nificant way of looking at these cases is to separate those in which
plaintiffs allege some particular type of union hostility towards
them on the part of their unions, from those in which the union's
alleged misconduct does not involve animosity toward any particu-
lar individual or group."' In terms of the Supreme Court's lan-
guage,1 62 this approach would entail separating the cases that in-
volve bad faith, hostility, or discrimination on the one hand, from
those involving only perfunctory or arbitrary conduct on the
other. 16 3
Classifying the published opinions in this manner, however,
was difficult because, in a substantial minority of the cases, infor-
mation in the opinion was not sufficient to determine whether bad
faith or hostility of any type was alleged.1 Where such informa-
tion was explicitly provided, or could reasonably be read between
the lines, allegations of hostility or discrimination were made in
less than forty percent of the cases, as Table 12 demonstrates.
Among the courthouse files examined, ninety-one percent pro-
vided sufficent information to make a determination. Of those
cases, hostility or discrimination was alleged only twenty-two per-
cent of the time. Table 12 provides data on the precise nature of
the hostility or discrimination alleged.
1 6 5
161. See, e.g., NLRB M~mo, supra note 48; Cheit, supra note 12; Jacobs, The Duty of
Fair Representation: Minorities, Dissidents and Exclusive Representation, 59 B.U.L. REV. 857
(1979); VanderVelde, supra note 12.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 55-77.
163. Of course, many cases involve allegations of perfunctory or arbitrary conduct in
addition to allegations of bad faith, hostility, or discrimination.
164. For example, in many opinions addressing such procedural issues as the statute of
limitations or exhaustion of internal union remedies, very !ittle information about the mer-
its of the plaintiffs' claims was provided.
165. All duty of fair representation cases alleging hostility or discrimination could not





BASIS OF ALLEGED UNION HOSTILITY
Published Opinions Courthouse Cases
Adjusted Adjusted















or union rival 29 3.6 6.8 16 8.5 9.4
Personality conflict 21 2.6 4.9 5 2.7 2.9
Not union member 15 1.9 3.5 1 0.1 0.1
Other 22 2.7 5.1 9 4.8 5.3
Table 13 provides information about the claims asserted
against employers in hybrid section 301/fair representation cases.
Not surprisingly, discharge claims constitute a majority, probably
because plaintiffs are likely to have a greater incentive to sue
when a job is lost. In this regard, it may be noted that many se-
niority disputes also entail loss of employment, although the pre-
cise number of such cases was not broken down. Finally, in con-
cluding this subsection on the allegations made by plaintiffs in the
cases studied, Table 14 presents data on additional allegations
that sometimes accompany section 301 or duty of fair representa-
tion claims.
166. The percentages in this column are computed by using only those opinions in
which sufficient information was provided to determine whether any hostility was alleged.
167. The percentages in this column were computed by using only those courthouse














or other fringe benefits






























168. The percent columns in this table each total more than 100% because in a num-




ADDITIONAL CLAIMS ASSERTED IN
DFR LITIGATION"6 9
Published Opinions Courthouse Cases
Type of Claims Number Percent Number Percent
No other allegations 567 70.1 131 69.7
Claims under statutes
prohibiting discrimina-
tion on grounds of race,
sex, religion, national
origin, age, or
handicap 103 12.7 9 4.8




of 1959170 claims 31 3.8 2 1.1
Pension claims 14 1.7 2 1.1
Other allegations 55 6.8 17 9.0
D. The Resolution of the Claims: Who Wins and on What Grounds?
Data on the parties and on the nature of the claims asserted
are, for the most part, readily available from published opinions
on the duty of fair representation. Information on the ultimate
outcome of such litigation, however, is less complete. Of the pub-
lished opinions included in this study, almost one fourth were in-
terlocutory opinions that did not result directly in a judgment for
any party.171 Similarly, no clear winner was revealed in a majority
of the cases surveyed in courthouse files. An analysis of the data
available, however, leaves little doubt that plaintiffs hardly ever
prevail in duty of fair representation litigation.
169. The percent columns in this table each total more than 100% because in a num-
ber of cases, two or more additional allegations were present.
170. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982).
171. Of the published opinions, summary judgment motions were denied in 5.9% be-
cause of disputes of material fact; in 6.2%, defendants' motions to dismiss or for summary
judgment on statute of limitations grounds were denied; and in 5.3%, defendants' motions
to dismiss or for summary judgment on exhaustion of internal union remedies grounds
were denied. The remainder of the interlocutory opinions involved a wide variety of issues
not subject to useful classification.
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1. Cases in Which Plaintiffs Prevail. As Table 15 indicates,
plaintiffs prevailed on the merits of their claims in only 4.3% of
the duty of fair representation cases generating published opin-
ions between 1977 and 1983, and they prevailed in an even smaller
percentage (1.6) of the cases filed in three district courts between
1977 and 1982. Since more than one-third of the cases in the
courthouse files settled out of court, however, the terms of the
settlement agreements reached must be evaluated before a true
picture of plaintiffs' success rates can be drawn. The attorney sur-
vey was used to obtain this information, and as Table 16 demon-
strates, settlements favorable to plaintiffs were obtained in only
14.3% of the settlements about which information was available,




THE OUTCOME OF CASES REACHING FINAL JUDGMENT
ON FAIR REPRESENTATION AND/OR BREACH OF
CONTRACT CLAIMS
Published Opinions Courthouse Cases
Outcome Number Percent Number Percent
Judgment entered
for plaintiff 35 4.3 3 1.6
Judgment entered
for one or more
defendants 591 73.1 86 45.7
Case settled - - 67 35.6
Case still open - - 25 13.3
No information
re: outcome 183 22.6 7 3.7
172. It is very difficult, of course, to classify out-of-court settlements, which by defini-
tion entail some compromise by each party, as "favorable to plaintiff" or "favorable to
defendant." For present purposes, all settlements resulting in either the reinstatement of a
discharged plaintiff, or the payment of more than $10,000 (including attorneys' fees) to a
plaintiff, were classified as a settlement favorable to plaintiff. This classification is obviously
not foolproof, since a payment of $4500, for example, to a plaintiff who was not dis-
charged may be a substantial victory. Nevertheless, since close to 80% of the courthouse
cases involved discharges or seniority disputes which may have entailed layoffs, see supra
text accompanying note 168 (Table 13), this classification scheme seems reasonable. Only 7




THE NATURE OF THE OUT-OF-COURT SETTLEMENTS
OBTAINED BY PLAINTIFFS IN THE COURTHOUSE CASES
Terms of the Adjusted
settlement Number Percent Percent
173
No reinstatement, and
received no money 10 14.9 20.4
No reinstatement, and
received under $1000 10 14.9 20.4
No reinstatement, but
received $1001 - $5000 13 19.4 26.5
No reinstatement, but
received $5001 - $10,000 6 9.0 12.2
No reinstatement, but
received over $10,000 6 9.0 12.2
Obtained reinstatement
and received under $1000 1 1.5 2.0
Other 3 4.5 6.1
No information available 18 26.9
The data are, quite clear, therefore, that plaintiffs prevail in
only a small fraction of duty of fair representation cases. Adding
the number of judgments for plaintiffs found among the pub-
lished opinions and the courthouse cases to the number of
favorable out-of-court settlements generated among the court-
house cases indicates that plaintiffs succeeded in only 4.5% (45 out
of 997) of the cases surveyed. Although the sample was perhaps
too small for its findings to be considered conclusive, the charac-
teristics of the cases that may be considered plaintiff victories
yielded some interesting results.
The Teamsters union was involved in 22.2% of the forty-five
cases in which plaintiffs prevailed, whereas it was involved in a
slightly greater percentage (29.4) of all the cases generating pub-
lished opinions.17 4 The Steelworkers and Postal Workers, on the
173. The percentages in this column were computed by using only those settlements
about which information could be obtained through the attorney survey. See supra text
accompanying note 123.
174. See supra text accompanying note 136 (Table 7). There were 809 cases generat-
ing published opinions. See supra text accompanying notes 108-109.
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other hand, which accounted for 11.1% and 8.9% of plaintiff vic-
tories, respectively, were somewhat overrepresented in relation to
their percentage of the total published opinions (6.3% and 1.5%,
respectively). The United Auto Workers, however, which ac-
counted for 4.4% of plaintiff victories, was somewhat under-
represented, since it comprised 10.4% of the total opinions.175
Cases in which the alleged union misconduct involved the ne-
gotiation or ratification of a collective bargaining agreement were
also somewhat overrepresented among cases in which plaintiffs
prevailed-17.8% compared with 11.5% of all the cases sur-
veyed. 1 16 These figures are surprising because the courts purport
to give unions more leeway in negotiating contracts than in ad-
ministering them.17 The source of this apparent anomaly may lie
in the fact that twenty-five percent of these contract negotiation
cases also involved allegations of race or sex discrimination pro-
hibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.178 If those
cases were eliminated from consideration, the percentage of cases
involving contract negotiation in which plaintiffs prevailed would
drop to a more consistent 13.3%.
As to litigation involving issues of union misconduct in griev-
ance handling, the distribution of the types of such misconduct
for the cases in which plaintiffs prevailed corresponded roughly to
the distribution of such misconduct for all of the cases sur-
veyed,17 9 with one important exception: in only 6.7% of the cases
in which plaintiffs prevailed did the union's alleged wrongful con-
duct involve a conscious refusal to take a grievance to arbitration,
whereas such claims were made in 23.1% of all surveyed cases.
These figures strongly suggest that courts are quite reluctant to
second guess union decisions of this type. This result conforms
with the analysis of the court in Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co.,1180 which noted that courts are much more likely to apply a
negligence-like standard in cases involving the ministerial acts of
175. Id.
176. There were 115 cases out of 997 surveyed involving the negotiating or ratifying
of a contract, of which only eight plaintiffs prevailed. See supra text accompanying note 155
(Table 9).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 55-77.
178. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
179. See supra text accompanying note 160 (Table 11).
180. 749 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1983).
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unions, as opposed to union exercises of discretion.' 8'
It is difficult to determine whether plaintiffs won a dispropor-
tionate number of cases in which they alleged some type of ani-
mosity on the part of the union towards themselves as individuals
or as members of disfavored groups, because information about
the presence of such allegations was often absent from the pub-
lished opinions.18 2 Allegations of animosity, however, were pre-
sent in one-third of the cases in which the plaintiffs prevailed.
This figure is slightly lower than the 38.1% of cases involving ani-
mosity in the total of published opinions for which information
was available, but it is substantially higher than the adjusted per-
centage of 21.2 representing such allegations in courthouse
cases.1
8 3
The allegations of employer misconduct in cases plaintiffs
won differ in a number of ways from such allegations in all the
surveyed cases. For example, cases in which no employer miscon-
duct was alleged are somewhat overrepresented, comprising
13.3% of the cases in which plaintiffs prevailed, but only 5.7% of
all cases. Moreover, where employer misconduct was alleged, dis-
charge and seniority disputes are slightly underrepresented, com-
prising respectively 48.8% and 11.1% of the cases in which plain-
tiffs prevailed, as opposed to 56.9% and 17.1% of all the cases
studied. Cases alleging race, sex, or other types of employment
discrimination, on the other hand, are overrepresented, compris-
ing 17.8% of the cases in which plaintiffs prevailed, but only 6.9%
of all cases.'
8 4
Finally, the cases in which plaintiffs prevailed involve the dis-
proportionate presence of a number of additional claims aside
from the ordinary breach of the duty of fair representation and
breach of contract claims. For example, it should come as no sur-
prise in light of the foregoing findings'8 5 that Title VII and other
employment discrimination claims are overrepresented in the
cases in which plaintiffs prevailed, comprising 19.5% of those
cases, but only 11.2% of the total.' 8 Also overrepresented among
181. See supra text accompanying notes 62-68.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 164-65.
183. See supra text accompanying note 166 (Table 12).
184. See supra text accompanying note 168 (Table 13).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 177-78.
186. See supra text accompanying note 169 (Table 14).
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the cases plaintiffs won are claims arising under the Landrum-
Griffin Act,187 which were present in 6.7% of such cases, com-
pared to 3.3% of all the cases surveyed.
2. Cases in Which Plaintiffs Lose. The next major inquiry is to
determine why so many plaintiffs lose; are they losing on the mer-
its of their claims, or on procedural grounds unrelated to the mer-
its? Table 17 provides some answers to these questions. It shows
that in a very large percentage of cases, the plaintiffs lost without
ever having the opportunity to present the merits of their claims
to the court. In approximately forty-five percent of the cases,
plaintiffs lost because they filed their action after the expiration of
the statute of limitations, or without first attempting to exhaust
available internal union remedies.18 8 With so many cases being re-
solved on procedural grounds, it is not surprising that few duty of
fair representation cases ever reach trial. Table 18 shows the pro-
cedural postures of the courts' decisions.
IV. THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY
A. The Procedural Roadblocks
Professor Summers once described a hypothetical case of a
union which refused to process a grievance for wages owed under
a collective bargaining agreement as "the case of the paper prom-
187. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 §§ 1-707, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 401-531 (1982). See supra note 120.
188. See supra text accompany notes 173 (Table 15), and 189 (Table 17). Of 677 cases
in which judgment was entered for defendants, a missed statute of limitation or the failure
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189. The percentages in this table are based on the number of cases in which a final
judgment was entered for one or more of the defendants-591 cases generating published
opinions, and 86 courthouse cases. The percentages total more than 100% because in many




PROCEDURAL POSTURES OF THE COURTS' DECISIONS19
Published Opinions Courthouse Cases
Procedural Posture Number Percent Number Percent
Motion to dismiss,
or appeal therefrom1 91  193 23.9 35 39.3
Motion for summary
judgment, or
appeal therefrom1 92  488 60.3 41 46.1
Trial judge's opinion
following a bench trial 70 8.7 7 7.9
Jury verdict - - 6 6.7
Trial judge's opinion
following a jury trial1 9 3  6 0.1 8 9.0
Appeal from bench
trial 37 4.6 - -
Appeal from jury
trial 22 2.7 - -
Other procedural
posture 56 6.9 2 2.3
Unclear 6 0.1 - -
ise. ' 194 Unfortunately, the fact that so few plaintiffs now prevail in
hybrid section 301/fair representation suits suggests to many
plaintiffs' attorneys that it is the duty of fair representation itself
which is the "paper promise." Moreover, plantiffs' low success
rates are particularly troublesome because so many losing plain-
tiffs never have a day in court on the merits of their claims, due to
190. The percentages in this table are not based on all the published opinions in-
cluded in the study, but on only those courthouse cases which reached a final judgment, or
89 cases. The percentages total more than 100% because in some cases, the court's deci-
sion entailed more than a single procedural posture.
191. Defendants' motions for judgments on the pleadings are treated as motions to
dismiss for purposes of this table.
192. Motions to dismiss which were treated by the court as motions for summary judg-
ment because they were supported by matters outside the pleadings are treated as motions
for summary judgment for purposes of this table.
193. This category includes rulings on motions for directed verdicts and for judg-
ments notwithstanding the verdict.
194. Summers, supra note 12 at 263.
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their inability to surmount the procedural obstacles thrown in
their path. In this regard, it is worth noting these remarks from
Justice White:
The importance in our jurisprudence of the opportunity for a hearing need
not be reviewed, but at the very least it teaches that where persons with
otherwise justiciable claims cannot obtain a hearing under the law, the law is
subject to close scrutiny to discover the circumstances compelling this
result. 9 6
In duty of fair representation litigation, "this result" is to a
large extent a product of the interaction between a short limita-
tions period and requirements of exhaustion of internal union
remedies, on the one hand,1"" and the characteristics of the plain-
tiffs and their attorneys, on the other. Indeed, the evolution and
current operation of the hybrid section 301/fair representation
cause of action is, in many respects, a classic illustration of Profes-
sor Galanter's theory of "why the 'haves' come out ahead:"1 "
Plaintiffs tend to be unsophisticated "one-shot" litigants, without
ready access to the assistance of counsel (and in most cases without
any access to experienced labor lawyers),198 facing the combined
and usually substantial resources of defendants. These defendants
195. Amalgamated Ass'n of Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 330
(1971) (White, J., dissenting).
196. Approximately 45% of plaintiffs' losses in the cases examined for this study were
the result of missed statutes of limitations, or failures to exhaust internal union remedies.
See supra text accompanying note 189 (Table 17).
197. See Galanter, supra note 142.
198. Obtaining the services of an attorney for duty of fair representation cases is no
easy matter. A recently discharged worker is likely to have difficulty paying any significant
retainer, and lawyers familiar with this cause of action are usually willing to take only the
strongest cases on a contingency basis, because they are aware of how difficult it is for
plaintiffs to prevail. See Tobias, in THE CHANGING LAW, supra note 8.
Moreover, very few lawyers with experience in labor law are willing to risk alienating
their union or management client in order to represent rank and file employees. See Rabin,
The Impact of the Duty of Fair Representation Upon Labor Arbitration, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 851,
876 (1978); cf. Modjeska, Which Side Are You On?, 41 OHIo ST. LJ. 273 (1980) (discussing the
polarized nature of the labor law bar). Indeed, the attorney survey revealed that 35.5% of
the plaintiffs' lawyers had no prior experience handling duty of fair representation cases,
whereas only 7.5% of the defendants' lawyers were inexperienced. Similarly, 62.9% of the
plaintiffs' lawyers, but only 8.9% of defendants' lawyers, devoted less than 10% of their
legal practice to labor law. In addition, 67.2% of the defendants' lawyers devoted over 75%
of their practices to labor law, while only 17.8% of the plaintiffs' lawyers specialized in
labor law to this degree. Important efforts to improve the quality of representation availa-
ble to plaintiffs have recently been initiated by the Plaintiff Employment Lawyers Associa-
tion, headed by Cincinnati attorney Paul H. Tobias.
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are generally experienced "repeat players," and are represented
by labor law specialists who have helped their clients structure
their transactions to take advantage of familiar legal rules-rules
which these specialists may have even helped to shape in prior
litigation.
Given this background, the six month limitations period
adopted by the Court in DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters"9 is too short. It should be lengthened to at least a year
either by the Court, upon its reconsideration of the issue, or by
Congress. Otherwise, the courts should at the very least adopt a
liberal policy towards tolling the start of the period where appro-
priate. For example, the six month period should begin to run
only when the grievant learns, or reasonably should have learned,
that the grievance has been lost or that the union is no longer
processing it.200 In addition, the limitations period should be
tolled pending the exhaustion of internal union remedies, where
such exhaustion is required. 0 1
Ironically, the rationale for a longer limitations period can be
found in the DelCostello decision itself, which had substituted the
six month limitations period in the place of an even shorter one.
The Court explained quite accurately the position of many em-
ployees after they have lost their grievance, or after their union
has decided not to take the grievance to arbitration:
[T]he employee will often be unsophisticated in collective-bargaining mat-
ters, and he will almost always be represented solely by the union. He is
called upon, within the limitations period, to evaluate the adequacy of the
union's representation, to retain counsel, to investigate substantial matters
that were not at issue in the arbitration proceeding, and to frame his suit.
202
199. 462 U.S. 151 (1983). See supra text accompanying notes 96-100.
200. See, e.g., Brown v. College of Medicine, 167 N.J. 532, 401 A.2d 288 (1979).
201. The Supreme Court acknowledged the propriety of such tolling in Clayton v.
UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 695 (1981). See also Pesola v. Inland Tool & Mfg., Inc., 423 F. Supp.
30 (E.D. Mich. 1976). Indeed, even where not requried by Clayton, the voluntary exhaus-
tion of internal union remedies should toll the limitations period for two reasons. First, the
grievant may not know whether such exhaustion would be futile, and he or she should not
be forced to choose between missing the limitations period, on the one hand, or risking
dismissal for failure to exhaust, on the other. Second, as the court in Clayton recognized,
exhaustion of even futile internal remedies can be beneficial. For example, it could result
in the grievant deciding not to pursue his or her claim in court, "either because the union
offered him a favorable settlement, or because it demonstrated that his underlying ...
claim was without merit." 451 U.S. at 689.
202. 462 U.S. at 166.
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Unfortunately, the Court's preoccupation with "uniformity in
the labor law field"203 led it to adopt a six month limitations pe-
riod better suited to administrative proceedings. As the Court
later acknowledged in an analogous context:
[Tihe practical difficulties facing an aggrieved person who invokes ad-
ministrative remedies are strikingly different [from those facing the plaintiff
in a lawsuit] .... A person's sole responsibility under [an administrative]
scheme is to 'make, sign and file with the [agency] a complaint in writing
under oath'. . . . The complaint need contain no more than the name and
address of the person or entity alleged to have committed the discriminatory
act [and] 'the particulars thereof. . . . [H]e has no obligation to investigate
his allegations more fully. The entire burden of investigating and developing
the case rests on the [administrative agency].
2
04
If the Supreme Court's concern with "the realities of labor rela-
tions and litigation" 20 5 is sincere, perhaps the findings of this
study will help it to realize that the six month limitations period it
adopted in DelCostello is insufficient.
The findings here also suggest that the courts should be more
sensitive to the realities of labor relations when ruling on defense
motions to dismiss duty of fair representation suits for failure to
exhaust internal union remedies. It is true, of course, that Clayton
v. United Automobile Workers" 6 was a victory for plaintiffs, since it
requires exhaustion of internal union remedies in only limited cir-
cumstances.20 7 However, it is likely that many unions, spurred on
by their fear of increased liability in the wake of Bowen v. United
States Postal Service,20 8 will succeed in tailoring their internal reme-
203. Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S. Ct. 2924, 2931 n.14 (1984) (explaining DelCostello).
204. Id. at 2930 (citations omitted). In Burnett, the Court held that Maryland's six
month limitations period for filing employment discrimination complaints with the state
human rights agency did not provide a sufficient period for filing federal employment dis-
crimination suits pursuant to the Reconstruction era civil rights statutes (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 (1982)). Although the majority in Bur-
nett distinguished DelCostello because of the importance of uniformity in labor law, 104 S.
Ct. at 2931 n.14, the dissent expressly noted that "the 'practicalities' of litigation seem
materially the same" in the two cases. Id. at 2935 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This argu-
ment supports a longer limitations period for duty of fair representation suits as well as it
supports the dissent's preference for a shorter period in civil rights suits.
205. Id. at 2931 n.14; DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 167.
206. 451 U.S. 679 (1981).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 101-103. Indeed, the published opinions from
1982, the first full year after the Clayton decision, indicate that defendants obtained dismis-
sals for failure to exhaust internal union remedies only half as often as in 1980, the last full
year before the decision.
208. 459 U.S. 212 (1983). See infra text accompanying notes 91-95.
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dies so that exhaustion will be required under Clayton.20 In this
event, courts should be receptive to good faith arguments by
plaintiffs that they were unaware of the availability of such reme-
dies.2 10 The union should have the burden of proving that it in-
formed the plaintiff specifically of the internal union remedies at
the time his or her grievance was withdrawn or lost.2 11 Courts
must also be alert to the very real possibility of bias in many inter-
nal union procedures, and should waive exhaustion requirements
where any evidence of such bias is present.
2 12
B. The Standard Revisited
Procedural roadblocks aside, it may be argued that plaintiffs
prevail in so few duty of fair representation suits because they sim-
ply have non-meritorious claims which they deserve to lose. Cer-
tainly this is true in many cases. For example, I was frankly sur-
209. See supra note 95. Thus, while there has been a drop since Clayton in the number
of cases in which defendants successfully used the exhaustion defense, see supra note 207,
that drop may be only temporary.
210. As Fox and Sonenthal point out:
[Ulnions are not required to supply even their members with copies of their
constitutions, which contain information about both the exhaustion require-
ment and the appeals procedures. Moreover, when the union ceases to be the
employee's advocate in a grievance proceeding, and suddenly becomes his ad-
versary in a potential intra-union disciplinary proceeding, one may safely as-
sume that it will do little to inform th employee about, much less to assist him
in exhausting, intra-union remedies. Most union constitutions also prohibit
outside legal counsel from representing members in intra-union proceedings.
Under these circumstances, it is absurd to think that a union member will, by
himself, be able to pursue quasi-judicial union procedures or effectively to advo-
cate a union breach of its statutory duty of fair representation.
Fox & Sonenthal, supra note 12, at 1031.
211. Id.
212.
As a practical matter . . . there are likely to be strong ties of interest between
local officers and the national union officials who may later be required to eval-
uate the conduct of their local colleagues. To be sure, the politics of each union
differ, and there may even be situations in which national union officials are
politically hostile toward local officers whose conduct in processing a grievance
is before them on review, but normally the administrators of any organization
will unite to resist challenges to their authority posed by outsiders. Clearly, a
claim of unfair representation may appear as just such a challenge. Moreover,
in some cases, there may be a political conflict important to the international
union underlying the unfair-representation claim-for example, when the
grievant is a member of an opposition group within the union ....
Id. at 1005-06.
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prised during our courthouse survey at how many of these cases
had been filed (often originally in a state court) as ordinary breach
of contract actions, with no indication on the face of the pleadings
that the plaintiffs' attorneys had any idea that they would have to
prove a breach of the duty of fair representation before the court
would reach their contract claims.21 Cases of this type, however,
are usually disposed of quickly and cheaply;214 they should not be
used as an excuse for maintaining unnecessarily harsh standards
which have the effect of throwing the baby out with the bath
water.
There has been ample comment in recent years on the man-
ner in which the "arbitrary or perfunctory" branch of the Vaca
standard should be applied in the absence of allegations of hostile
or discriminatory conduct;1 5 thus, there is no need to enter that
fray here. There may be some value, however, in examining its
application where there is also evidence of hostility between the
grievants and their union-for in a number of recent cases, courts
have revealed an unwarranted readiness to grant defendants' mo-
tions for summary judgment on the merits of their duty of fair
representation claims, in spite of the presence of substantial evi-
dence of union hostility towards the plaintiffs.1 6
213. Of course, this is further evidence that experienced labor lawyers are not readily
available to represent employees in these cases; the fact that duty of fair representation
allegations were not made does not always mean they could not have been made by more
knowledgeable lawyers. See supra note 198. Moreover, the bare contract claims uncovered
in the study did not necessarily lack merit.
214. The attorney survey revealed that most defense lawyers in fair representation
litigation, especially those representing unions, have extensive experience defending such
cases. For such lawyers, it would not be a major project to "cut and paste" effective, albeit
boilerplate, motions to dismiss and supporting memoranda in cases like those described in
the text. The courthouse files revealed that many such motions were sufficient to secure a
stipulated dismissal from the plaintiff without even the need for a ruling from the bench.
215. See, e.g., Cheit, supra note 12; Harper & Lupu, supra note 12; Summers, supra
note 12; VanderVelde, supra note 12; Note, The Case for Ordinary Negligence, supra note 66.
216. See, e.g., Early v. Eastern Transfer, Inc., 699 F.2d 552 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 93 (1983); Russom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2353 (E.D. Mo.
1982); Spielmann v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Thompson v. Teamsters Local 988, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3261 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Hanson
v. Knutson, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3259 (D. Mont. 1981); Sears v. Automobile Carriers,
Inc., 526 F. Supp. 1143 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Compofelice v. United Food & Commercial
Workers, Local 400, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2839 (D.D.C. 1980); Mangiaguerra v. D & L
Transp., Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ill. 1976); cf. Winter v. Teamsters Local 639, 569
F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (exhaustion of internal union remedies not futile despite the
knowledge of union officials that plaintiff was engaging in dissident activities).
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In the context of hostility between union officials and union
members, courts must be aware that misconduct which appears to
consitute mere negligence or poor judgment may actually be
something more. Union officials intent on mishandling a griev-
ance can ordinarily be counted on to do so subtly, in order to
keep any sign of a "smoking gun" well hidden. To foreclose juries
from examining the evidence and drawing the appropriate infer-
ences in such cases is to virtually guarantee that such union mis-
conduct will never be remedied.1 7 Moreover, questions of malice,
bad faith, and discriminatory intent necessarily involve inquiries
into the defendants' states of mind, and in such cases, summary
judgment is particulary disfavored.218
As the Supreme Court recently stated in an employment dis-
crimination action, a plaintiff "may prove his case by direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence," and a trial court should not require plain-
tiffs "to submit direct evidence of discriminatory intent. ' 219 Thus,
at least in discharge cases, which many courts have acknowledged
require particularly careful treatment,220 evidence of apparent
negligence or poor judgment in the union's grievance handling,
combined with evidence of actual or potential hostility-for ex-
217. See Hughes v. Teamsters Local 683, 554 F.2d 365, 368 (9th Cir. 1977):
Appellant is caught between a hostile employer and a [hostile] union . . . . If
summary judgment would be proper if the present case, all a union would have
to do to protect itself against a fair representation suit would be to go through
the motions of processing an employee's grievance short of arbitration sufficient
to withstand a claim that these motions were merely perfunctory. In this way,
an employee with a legitimate claim against his employer would have no means
of adjudicating his claim.
Cf. Alvey v. General Electric Co., 622 F.2d 1279, 1290 (7th Cir. 1980) (reversing jury
verdict for defendants because jury was prohibited from considering "the heated words
expressed on both sides, and the underlying antagonism between" two groups of employ-
ees, without which a determination of whether the union violated the duty of fair represen-
tation "cannot fairly be made"); Hall v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 281 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Cal.
1968) (allegations of personal animosity and procedural irregularities at joint committee
hearing were sufficient to withstand motion to dismiss).
218. See, e.g., Baldini v. Local 1095, UAW, 581 F.2d 145, 151 (7th Cir. 1978); Hines
v. Teamsters Local 377, 506 F.2d 1153, 1157 (6th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub
nor. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976). See generally 10A C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2730 (1983).
219. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3
(1983) (emphasis added).
220. See, e.g., Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 749 F.2d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir.
1983); Miller v. Gateway Transp. Co., 616 F.2d 272, 277 n.12 (7th Cir. 1980); Griffin v.
UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972).
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ample, the grievant's open participation in dissident activities di-
rected at the union officials who handled his or her griev-
ance-should be sufficient to defeat a defendant's summary
judgment motion and permit the case to go to a jury.221
C. Alternative Causes of Action
The most troubling aspect of the operation of the duty of fair
representation in hybrid section 301 suits is that many workers
who have in fact been wrongfully discharged by their employers
are barred from any remedy because their unions' conduct in han-
dling their grievances did not amount to breaches of the duty ac-
cording to current standards. Aside from lowering some of the
procedural roadblocks and easing the burden of proving a breach
of the duty, there are alternatives for some of these wrongfully
discharged workers: additional causes of action which already ex-
ist, although clearly in the shadow of the hybrid section 301/fair
representation suit.
1. Actions to Vacate Arbitration or Joint Committee Awards Be-
cause of Fraud, Partiality, or other Misconduct on the Part of the Arbi-
trator or Committee Members. The first additional cause of action is
one to vacate an arbitration award because of fraud, partiality, or
other misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. 22 This cause of
action may be particularly valuable to employees whose breach of
contract claims have been rejected by joint labor-management
grievance committees such as those commonly established under
221. As one commentator, who for the most part rejects the use of a negligence stan-
dard in duty of fair representation cases, stated:
Although courts should continue to reject a pure 'negligence' standard for
grievance processing in favor of a standard that asks whether the union's pres-
entation was so poor that it deprived plaintiff of a fair hearing, carelessness
should be sufficient by itself if the employee presents any evidence of animosity.
Otherwise, the danger of letting unions 'throw' grievances would nullify the
employee's chance for a fair determination of his contract rights.
Clark, supra note 12, at 1171.
222. See, e.g., Morris v. Werner-Continental, Inc., 466 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 965 (1972); Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123,
1128 n.27 (3d Cir. 1969); Yates v. Yellow Freight Sys., 501 F. Supp. 101, 104 (S.D. Ohio
1980); Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191 (D. Conn. 1974), affid on other grounds,
514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975); ef. Commonwealth Coatings Corp.
v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968) ("[w]e cannot believe that it was the
purpose of Congress to" authorize litigants to submit their cases and controversies to arbi-




Teamster contracts. 22 As the president of the American Arbitra-
tion Association stated, "[t]he joint grievance committee system of
arbitration found in Teamster contracts 'is so clearly defective as
an impartial mechanism that it is not surprising that we keep see-
ing it tested in the courts.' "224
In some respects, proving bias or misconduct on the part of
the members of a joint committee in order to vacate a grievance
award is similar to proving a breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion on the part of the union officials processing the grievance.
Indeed, one of the principal defects of the joint committee system
is that union officials seeking to sabotage the grievances of unpop-
ular or dissident members can appear to vigorously present griev-
ances to the committee, thereby insulating themselves from
charges of breaching the duty, while relying on political allies on
the committee to reject the grievance. 225 This creates a void in
the duty of fair representation, however, since a number of courts
have held that union representatives on joint committees owe no
duty to grievants from other locals. 226 Thus, an action to vacate a
grievance award on the basis of committee member misconduct
can be an effective means of filling this gap in coverage.
2. Actions to Vacate Arbitration or Joint Committee Awards on the
Ground That the Awards Violate Public Policy. A second cause of ac-
tion may also be available to workers whose grievances have been
taken through arbitration: to vacate an arbitration or joint com-
mittee award on the ground that it violates public policy. 227 This
cause of action would be available, for example, to a truck driver
223. See supra text accompanying notes 147-49. Although these joint committees are
quite different from grievance procedures using neutral, outside arbitrators, the Supreme
Court has generally treated them as though they were the same. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Gen-
eral Drivers v. Riss & Co., 376 U.S. 517 (1963).
224. Arbitration and Supreme Court Rulings, 107 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 147 Uune 2, 1981)
(quoting Robert Coulson). See also supra note 149.
225. See Summers, supra note 149.
226. See, e.g., Early v. Eastern Transfer, Inc., 699 F.2d 552, 557-60 (lst Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 93 (1983); Teamsters Local 30 v. Helms Express, Inc., 591 F.2d 211, 217
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 837 (1979).
227. See, e.g., Kane Gas Light & Heating Co. v. International Bhd. of Firemen & Oil-
ers, Local 112, 687 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983); Local P-
1236, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jones Dairy Farm, 680 F.2d 1142, 1143-44 (7th Cir.
1982); Permaline Corp. of Am. v. Local 230, Int'l Bhd. of Painters, 639 F.2d 890 (2d Cir.




discharged for refusing to violate state or federal truck safety reg-
ulations, but whose discharge was upheld by a joint grievance
committee because of union negligence in handling the grievance
insufficient to constitute a breach of the duty of fair
representation .2
28
Most cases challenging arbitration awards as violative of pub-
lic policy, however, have been brought by unions or employers.221 9
In fact, a recent decision by the Third Circuit, Vosch v. Werner
Continental, Inc., 30 held that individual employees do not even
have standing to bring such actions themselves unless they can
prove that their unions breached the duty of fair representation.
Vosch is correct, of course, in asserting that an employee who has
lost a grievance and who subsequently attacks the arbitration
award as violative of public policy is not in a very different posi-
tion from an employee who has lost a grievance and attacks the
award as being a simple violation of the collective bargaining
agreement. The ultimate relief sought is the same, and the two
claims can perhaps even be asserted in a single action. It is there-
fore tempting to conclude that if proof of a union's breach of the
duty of fair representation is required in one case, it should also
be required in the other.
Unfortunately, such a conclusion is seriously flawed. It fo-
cuses on the superficial similarities in the positions of the plain-
tiffs, and ignores the much more significant differences in the pur-
poses and the underlying characteristics of the two types of
challenges to arbitration awards. When a plaintiff is simply claim-
ing that his or her employer breached the collective bargaining
agreement, a number of major policies, basic to the scheme of
modern American labor law, counsel against allowing the em-
ployee unfettered access to the courts in order to sue the em-
ployer. These policies and principles, as developed in the Steel-
228. Cf. Teamsters Local 249 v. Consolidated Freightways, 464 F. Supp. 346 (W.D.
Pa. 1979) (vacating a grievance award which upheld the employer's right to compel truck
drivers to drive tractors without mudflaps, and to haul trailers without trailer plates, both
required by state law, so long as the employer agreed to pay any fines if the drivers re-
ceived citations for the violations). The plaintiffs in DelCostello v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 155 (1983), and Miller v. Gateway Transp. Co., 616 F.2d 272
(7th Cir. 1980), among other cases, alleged that they were discharged for refusing to drive
unsafe or unlawful equipment.
229. See supra note 227.
230. 734 F.2d 149, 154-55 & n.10 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 784 (1985).
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workers Trilogy23 ' and the line of cases culminating in Vaca v.
Sipes,232 include the notions that contract grievance machinery is
at the heart of industrial self-government; 233 that the parties to a
collective bargaining agreement have bargained for an arbitra-
tor's (or grievance committee's) interpretation of their agreement,
not a court's; 23 4 that unions, as the exclusive representatives of
their bargaining units, have an interest in controlling the presen-
tation of grievances; 23 5 and that the parties' motivation for estab-
lishing grievance procedures would be undermined if grievance
decisions were subject to frequent and broad judicial review. 23
All of these policies militate against allowing employees access to
the courts for ordinary contract disputes, unless the employee can
first prove that the grievance process "has fundamentally malfunc-
tioned" by reason of a union's breach of its duty of fair
representation.237
None of these policies and principles, however, apply when
the employee is challenging the grievance award as being violative
of public policy. For example, no court has ever suggested that
industrial self-government entails the right to enter into contracts
which violate the law, or the right to enforce otherwise legal con-
tracts in an illegal manner. On the contrary, public policy chal-
lenges to grievance awards are designed precisely to prevent such
conduct.
238
Similarly, public policy challenges to grievance awards do not
undermine the parties' preference for arbitrators or grievance
committees as the final interpreters of their collective bargaining
agreements. A court, by vacating a grievance award as contrary to
public policy, is not reinterpreting the contract; it is simply hold-
ing that the contract, as interpreted by the arbitrator or grievance
231. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
232. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). See, e.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650
(1965).
233. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 580-81.
234. Id. at 582; Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 596-99.
235. Maddox, 379 U.S. at 653.
236. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 192.
237. Hines v. Anchor Motor, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 569 (1976).
238. As the court stated in Permaline Corp. of Am. v. Local 230, Int'l Bhd. of Paint-
ers, 639 F.2d 890, 895 (2d Cir. 1981): "If. . .the award in question is contrary to law or
public policy, it is open to, indeed it is incumbent upon, the court to step in."
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committee, violates public policy. But when an arbitrator invokes
public policy to resolve a grievance, he is relying on "considera-
tions ...wholly independent of the collective bargaining agree-
ment . . . .[H]e has overstepped his authority and the court[s]
may review the substantive merits of the award.
'2 39
Neither fears of too frequent, or too broad, judicial review of
grievance awards, nor unions' interests in controlling the presen-
tation of grievances justify a requirement that employees prove
breaches of the duty of fair representation before they can chal-
lenge awards as being violative of public policy. Most discharge
grievances involve such mundane fact patterns as employees who
are habitually late or absent; employees who have been caught
drinking, fighting, or stealing on the job; or employees who be-
lieve their seniority was violated in a layoff situation. Only rarely
will grievances involve important public policy issues.240 Unions
need only fear losing control of the small number of grievances
which culminate in decisions that violate public policy. For these
grievances, union control obviously does not yield results worthy
of judicial deference.
There are other strong countervailing reasons why a breach
of the duty of fair representation should not be required where
public policy issues are involved. Unlike ordinary contract claims,
which typically involve only the interests of the employer, the
union and the employees, public policy challenges by definition
concern the interests of a significant additional "party"-the pub-
lic. The public's interest in vacating unlawful grievance awards is
totally separate and distinct from the grievant's interest in being
fairly represented by his or her union. In the event the union or
the employer fails to challenge unlawful grievance awards, it
serves the public's interest to permit the aggrieved employees to
do so in their stead, without having to prove an unrelated fair
representation claim. As the Supreme Court stated in an analo-
gous context:
[E]ven if the employee's claim were meritorious, his union might, without
239. Local P-1236, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jones Dairy Farm, 680 F.2d 1142,
1144 (7th Cir. 1982).
240. Cf Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy
Exception, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1931, 1947 (1983) ("[c]ourts typically define [public policy] in
extremely broad terms .... In applying this concept to wrongful discharge cases, how-
ever, many courts have reached remarkably narrow results").
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breaching its duty of fair representation, reasonably and in good faith decide
not to support the claim vigorously in arbitration .... [A] union balancing
individual and collective interests might validly permit some employees' [in-
terests] to be sacrificed if [it] would result in increased benefits in the bar-
gaining unit as a whole.
2 41
Unions and employers obviously have no incentive to challenge
grievance awards resulting from this type of balancing, even
where the awards violate public policy. The public interest will
therefore remain undefended unless individual employees are per-
mitted to raise these challenges, independent of any fair represen-
tation claims they may have.242
3. State Tort Actions for Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Pub-
lic Policy. Finally, employees discharged in violation of public pol-
icy may be able to pursue state tort remedies even if their union
decides not to take the employees' discharge grievance to arbitra-
tion. Many states in recent years have recognized a public policy
exception to the employment at will doctrine, 24 and a growing
241. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 742 (1981); see also Mc-
Donald v. City of West Branch, 104 S. Ct. 1799, 1803 (1984); Alexander v. Gardner-Den-
ver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 & n.19 (1974).
242. Even where the collective bargaining agreement contains a provision essentially
adopting a statutory or regulatory standard, the Supreme Court has counseled against de-
ferring to the grievance award:
To be sure, the tension between contractual and statutory objectives may be
mitigated where a collective bargaining agreement contains provisions facially
similar to those of Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964]. But other facts
may still render arbitral processes comparatively inferior to judicial processes in
protection of Title VII rights. Among these is the fact that the specialized com-
petence of arbitrators pertains primarily to 'the law of the shop, not the law of
the land.'
Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57. This is especially true when joint grievance committees are used
to resolve grievances. See, e.g., Barrantine, 450 U.S. at 743. "Moreover, even though a par-
ticular arbitrator may be competent to interpret and apply statutory law, he may not have
the contractual authority to do so." Id. at 744. Thus, where a plaintiff has alleged facts
relating to a grievance award which, if proven, would establish a violation of public policy,
and where that plaintiff has enough evidence supporting his or her claim to survive a sum-
mary judgment motion, he or she is entitled to a trial de novo on the claim.
243. See, e.g., Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 225, 685 P.2d
1081, 1089 (1984) (en banc); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 572-73,
335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (1983); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 NJ. 58, 67-69,
417 A.2d 505, 509-12 (1980); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 176, 610
P.2d 1330, 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 844 (1980); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d
270 (W.Va. 1978); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 647-48, 245 N.W.2d 151,
153 (1976); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 181-85, 319 A.2d 174, 178-
80 (1974). See generally Note, supra note 240; Note, Defining Public Policy Torts in At-Will
Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REV. 153 (1981).
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number of courts have been expressly extending this exception to
employees covered by collective bargaining agreements.244 Per-
haps the key distinction is not whether the plaintiff is an at will or
unionized employee, but whether another remedy is available to
the plaintiff. According to one court:
It is clear. . . that the whole rationale undergirding the public policy excep-
tion is the vindication or the protection of certain strong policies of the com-
munity. If these policies or goals are preserved by other remedies, then the
public policy is sufficiently served. Therefore, the application of the public
policy exception requires two factors: (1) that the discharge violate some
well-established public policies; and (2) that there be no remedy to protect
the interest of the aggrieved employee or society.4 5
Employers, of course, can be expected to argue that contrac-
tual grievance procedures provide all the protection employees
need, and all they are entitled to. Contractual remedies, however,
may not be adequate to protect the public interest. In submitting
a grievance to arbitration or to a joint grievance committee, an
employee seeks to vindicate only his contractual rights under the
collective bargaining agreement and nothing more:
As the proctor of the bargain, the arbitrator's task is to effectuate the intent
of the parties. His source of authority is the collective bargaining agreement
.... If an arbitral decision is based 'solely on the arbitrator's view of the
requirements of enacted legislation,' rather than on an interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator has 'exceeded the scope of
his submission,' and the award will not be enforced.24 6
Employers may also argue that an extension of state wrongful
discharge actions to employees covered by collective bargaining
agreements undermines the federal labor policies that favor the
timely resolution of labor disputes through contractually created
grievance procedures.247 Certainly this argument is quite persua-
244. See, e.g., Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3807 (1985); Messenger v. Volkswagon of Am., 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
23 (S.D.W. Va. 1984); Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280
(1984); but see Vantine v. Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co. 762 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1985); Smith v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2253 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
245. Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1052, 1055 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (footnote
omitted), affd, 619 F.2d 276 (1980). See also Bonham v. Dresser Indus., 569 F.2d 187, 195
(3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
246. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974) (quoting United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)).
247. That argument is advanced in Pincus & Gillman, The Common Law Contract and
Tort Rights of Union Employees: What Effect After the Demise of the "At-Will" Doctrine?, 59 Cni.[-
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sive with regard to state causes of action that are based on a the-
ory of implied contract or implied covenant of fair dealing,24
since collective bargaining agreements preempt individual con-
tracts of employment and must be interpreted according to fed-
eral, not state law. 249 However, state remedies for a violation of
public policy generally sound in tort, rather than contract,250 and
state tort actions are often exempt from federal preemption. 2 "
Moreover, tort actions may offer more complete relief (in the
form of compensatory and punitive damages) than would be avail-
able through a contractual grievance procedure. It would be
ironic if these additional remedies were to be withheld from un-
ionized employees, while they were made available to non-union,
at will employees. Indeed, this would undermine the national la-
bor policy of encouraging collective bargaining, 2 2 because it
would increase the "costs" of union representation.
Even liberally construed, these three causes of action are
available to only a small minority of wrongfully dischared employ-
ees. Nevertheless, unions as well as employees should encourage
the law's development in this direction, because it would mean
that at least some wrongfully discharged workers will be able to
obtain remedies for their employers' wrongful conduct without
the necessity of suing their unions. Moreover, because two of the
three causes of action provide remedies for discharges that violate
]KENT L. REV. 1007 (1983). See generally Wheeler & Brown, Preemption of Wrongful Discharge
Claims of Employees Covered by Collective Bargaining Agreements, 1 LAB. LAW. 593 (1985).
248. See Note, supra note 240, at 1935-36.
249. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962);
J.1. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337-38 (1944). Moreover, state remedies for some
types of retaliatory discharges may be preempted by the National Labor Relations Act if
the employer's conduct is arguably an unfair labor practice. See generally Comment, State
Actions for Wrongful Discharge: Overcoming Barriers Posed by Federal Labor Law Preemption, 71
CALIF. L. REv. 942 (1983); Comment, NLRA Preemption of State Wrongful Discharge Claims,
34 HASTINGS LJ. 635 (1983).
250. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 176, 610 P.2d 1330,
1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 844 (1980) ("an employer's obligation to refrain from discharg-
ing an employee who refuses to commit a criminal act does not depend upon any express
or implied promises set forth in the [employment] contract . . . but rather reflects a duty
imposed by law upon all employers in order to implement the fundamental public policies
embodied in the state's penal statutes").
251. See, e.g., Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 305
(1977) (intentional infliction of emotional distress); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers,
Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 65 (1966) (malicious defamation).
252. See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
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public policy, they can play an important role in protecting not
only employees, but the general public as well, from employers
who abuse the power they have over their employees.
CONCLUSION
The empirical study reported in this Article has demonstrated
that plaintiffs win less than five percent of the duty of fair repre-
sentation cases they file. Moreover, in up to forty-five percent of
these cases, plaintiffs lose without ever having the merits of their
claims heard by a judge or jury.253 These findings suggest that
something is seriously wrong with the duty of fair representation
in practice. Indeed, a majority of both the plaintiffs' and defen-
dants' bars would probably agree with this assessment, although
for different reasons. From the plaintiffs' perspective, it can be
argued that too many workers are left without remedies for seri-
ous wrongs suffered at the hands of their employers and their un-
ions. Justice Black's criticism of the Court's decision in Vaca v.
Sipes seems all too perceptive: "The Court today opens slightly the
courthouse door to an employee's incidental claim against his
union for breach of its duty of fair representation, only to shut it
in his face when he seeks direct judicial relief for his underlying
and more valuable breach-of-contract claim against his em-
ployer. ' 254 From the defendants' perspective, on the other hand,
it can be argued that the plaintiffs' low success rates demonstrate
both that unions are doing an adequate job representing employ-
ees, and that too many frivolous fair representation suits are being
filed.
A third perspective may also be taken. It may be argued that
even though so few plaintiffs prevail, the duty of fair representa-
tion effectively protects most workers from union misconduct be-
cause the mere threat of litigation, and the associated defense
costs, deter wrongful conduct on the part of unions and encour-
ages unions to better train shop stewards, business agents, and
other union officials involved in grievance handling. Unfortu-
nately, this view is probably not as plausible as it may seem. Proce-
dural roadblocks in the form of an unnecessarily short limitations
period and the usually futile requirement that internal union rem-
253. See supra text accompanying notes 187-89.
254. 386 U.S. at 203 (Black, J., dissenting).
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edies be exhausted,255 along with the insistence in several circuits
that plaintiffs prove intentionally wrongful conduct on the part of
their unions,256 combine to permit most defendants to prevail on
virtually boilerplate motions to dismiss or for summary judgment.
Defense costs in such cases are low-they may even be covered by
liability insurance-and the deterrent effect of these suits is likely
to be minimal.
Writing for the majority in Vaca v. Sipes, Justice White praised
the duty of fair representation "as a bulwark to prevent arbitrary
union conduct against individuals stripped of traditional forms of
redress by the provisions of federal labor law." 25' 7 Certainly Justice
White is correct in asserting that the duty of fair representation
has evolved into a protective bulwark, but the findings of this
study suggest that at least in hybrid section 301/fair representa-
tion cases, it is a bulwark operating to protect employers from
their workers, not workers from their unions.
A number of recent developments, however, suggest that ma-
jor changes in the doctrine may be approaching. For example, a
profound split in the circuits has emerged as the lower courts
have been wrestling with the uncertain standards for proving a
breach of the duty.258 The Supreme Court will in all likelihood be
called upon to resolve this split in the near future. Moreover, the
Court's recent decision in Bowen v. United States Postal Service25 is
having the unintended and ironic effect of encouraging at least
some unions to consider returning to individual workers some of
the control over discharge grievances which unions struggled so
hard to achieve twenty years ago.260 Whatever direction these
changes may take, one would hope, along with Justice Black, that
they do not continue to manifest a preference "for accommodat-
ing the wishes of employers and unions in all things over the
desires of individual workers.
'261
255. See supra text accompanying notes 194-212.
256. See supra text accompanying note 77.
257. 386 U.S. at 182.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 64-77.
259. 459 U.S. 212.
260. See supra note 91-95.




A. Survey Form for Published Opinions
DFR SURVEY (Form 1) Your initials __
Date




0 - Unclear from opinion
1 - Employer only
2 - Union only
3 __ Both
4 _ Additional defendant(s), describe:
5. Union involved (whether or not a defendant):
6. Employer involved (whether or not a defendant):
7. Procedural posture:
0 Unknown or unclear from opinion
1 __ Motion to dismiss (or appeal therefrom)
2 - Motion for summary judgment (or appeal therefrom)
3 __ Motion for preliminary injunction
4 __ Trial judge's opinion following bench trial on merits
5 __ Trial judge's opinion following jury trial on merits
6 - Appeal from bench trial on the merits
7 - Appeal from jury trial on the merits
8 __ Other (explain):
8. Locus of alleged union misconduct:
0 __ Unknown or unclear
1 __ In negotiating contract
2 __ In handling a grievance before arbitration
3 _ In handling a grievance at or subsequent to
arbitration
4 __ Other (explain):
9. Nature of the union misconduct:
0 __ Unknown or unclear




2 - Negligently failing to file or process grievance or
seek arbitration (e.g. missing filing deadlines)
3 - Conscious refusal to take grievance to arbitration
4 - Improper or negligent conduct in handling griev-
ance in preliminary steps of grievance procedure
(e.g. failure to investigate, losing information, lying
about status of grievance)
5 - Improper representation at a grievance hearing or
arbitration hearing (e.g., not saying anything, not
calling witnesses, not bringing out relevant
evidence)
6 - Contract not properly ratified by rank and file, or
supplement to contract adopted which was not
properly ratified, or contrary to primary contract,
or improper conduct in obtaining contract
7 - Improper application of seniority provisions of
contract
8 - Negotiated contract is discriminatory or unfair
9 - Other (explain):
10 - Not applicable
10. Basis of union hostility toward plaintiff:
0 - No information in opinion
1 - None alleged
2 - Dissident activity
3 __ Union rival (may overlap with dissident activity)
4 - Race, sex, religious, national origin, handicap, or age
discrimination
5 Personality conflict between plaintiff and union
official(s)
6 - Other (explain):
7 - Not member of union
11. Nature of the employer's misconduct:
0 - No information, or opinion unclear
I - Not applicable
2 - Discharge without cause (explain employer's stated
grounds for discharge, e.g., absenteeism, drinking,
stealing, etc., if known):




4 Pay dispute (e.g. employee claims he should have re-
ceived overtime pay for certain work, or over
amount of vacation pay employee is entitled to, etc.)
5 - Discipline, short of discharge, without cause (explain
employer's stated reason):
6 - Improper change of contract or work rules or work-
ing conditions (explain):
7 - Race, sex, religious, national origin, handicap, or age
discrimination
8 - Dispute over pension benefits, other fringe benefits
9 __ Other (explain):
12. Other allegations or causes of action in the case, besides the
union's breach of the duty of fair representation, and/or the
employer's breach of the collective bargaining agreement:
A - Against union only
B - Against employer only
C - Against both
D - Against other defendants
0 - None made
1 - Tort (describe, e.g., assault, infliction of mental dis-
tress, interference with contractual relationship,
etc.):
2 - ERISA (pension claims)
3 __ LMRDA
4 - Race, sex, religious, national origin, handicap, or age
discrimination under federal or state civil rights
statutes
5 - Other (explain):
6 - Unclear if any made
13. Type of arbitration system involved in the case:
0 - None involved
1 - Neutral outside arbitrator, or tie-breaker
2 - Joint labor-management grievance committee (look
closely if a Teamster case)
3 __ Unclear
4 - Other (explain):
14. Did the opinion resolve procedural issues, and if so, who
won and what was the court's reasoning:
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P __ Decided in plaintiff's favor
D __ Decided in defendant's favor
0 __ Procedural issues not addressed in opinion
1 __ Statute of limitations
2 __ Exhaustion of internal union remedies
3 - Exhaustion of contractual remedies
4 - Class certification
5 - Other procedural issues, labor law related (explain):
6 - Other procedural issues, not 1.1. related (explain):
Explain court's reasoning briefly:
15. Did the opinion resolve the allegations of union misconduct
on the merits, and if so, who won and what was court's
reasoning:
0 - Not reached or not applicable
1 - Resolved in plaintiff's favor
2 __ Resolved in defendant's favor
3 - Other (explain):
4 __ Resolved in defendant's favor on motion to dismiss
or summary judgment (i.e., without a trial)
5 __ Factual dispute precludes summary judgment
Explain the court's reasoning briefly:
16. Did the opinion resolve the allegations of employer miscon-
duct on the merits, and if so, who won and what was the
court's reasoning:
0 - Not reached or not applicable
1 - Resolved in plaintiff's favor
2 - Resolved in defendant's favor
3 __ Other (explain):
4 - Resolved in defendant's favor on motion to dismiss
or for summary judgment (i.e., without a trial)
5 - Factual disputes preclude summary judgment
Explain the court's reasoning briefly:
17. Disposition on appeal
0 - Not applicable
1 - Affirmed on the same issue as lower court opinion
2 - Affirmed on other grounds
3 - Reversed on the same grounds as were ruled on by
lower court
4 - Reversed on other grounds
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4 __ Other (explain):
19. Describe and discuss any additional significant facts or issues
in the case not covered above:
B. Survey Form for Courthouse Cases
D.F.R. SURVEY (Form 3) Your initials __
Date
1. Case name and docket number:
2. Attorneys' names and phone numbers:
3. Court:
1 __ E.D. Pa.
2 - D. Md.
3 __ S.D.N.Y.
4. Current status:
1 __ Case closed
2 - Case still open in district court
3 __ Case up on appeal
4 __ Other (explain):
5. Defendants:
1 - Employer only
2 __ Union only
3 __ Both
4 - Additional defendant(s) (describe):
6. Union involved (whether or not a defendant):
7. Employer involved (whether or not a defendant):





8a. Removed from state court:
1 __ Yes
2 __ No
9. Was the case filed as a class action:
1 __ No
2 - Yes, but the class was never certified
3 - Yes, and the class was certified
10. Locus of the alleged union misconduct:
1 - Unknown or unclear
2 - In negotiating the contract
3 - In handling a grievance before arbitration
4_ In handling a grievance at or subsequent to
arbitration
5 __ Other (explain):
11. Nature of the alleged union misconduct:
1 __ Unknown or unclear
2 - Refusing to file or process grievance due to a con-
scious choice
3 - Negligently failing to file or process a grievance
(e.g., missing a filing deadline)
4 - Conscious refusal to take grievance to arbitration
5 Improper or negligent conduct in handling griev-
ance in preliminary steps of grievance procedure
(e.g., failure to investigate, losing information, lying
about status of grievance) (explain):
6 - Improper representation at a grievance or arbitra-
tion hearing (e.g., not saying anything, not calling
witnesses, not bringing out relevant evidence, under-
mining grievant's case) (explain):
7 - Contract not properly ratified by rank and file, or
supplement to contract adopted which was not prop-
erly ratified, or contrary to primary contract, or im-
proper conduct in obtaining contract (explain):
8 - Improper application of seniority provisions of the
contract (explain):




10 - Other (explain):
11 _- Not applicable
12. Basis of union hostility toward the plaintiff:
1 - Unknown or unclear
2 - None alleged
3 - Dissident activity
4 __ Union rival (may overlap with dissident activity)
5 - Race, sex, religious, national origin, handicap, or age
discrimination
6 Personality conflict between plaintiff and union
official(s)
7 - Plaintiff is anti-union (e.g., seeks decertification, re-
fuses to join) (explain):
8 __ Other (explain):
13. Is plaintiff a member of the union:
1 - Unknown or unclear
2 - Yes
3 - No
14. Nature of the employer's misconduct:
1 - Unknown or unclear
2 - Not applicable
3 8 Discharge without cause (explain employer's stated
grounds for discharge, if known, e.g., absenteeism,
drinking, causing an accident, etc.):
4 __ Other discipline, short of discharge, without cause
(explain nature of discipline, and the employer's
stated reason, if known):
5 - Violation of seniority, or layoff and recall provisions
of the contract (explain):
6 - Pay dispute (e.g., employee claims he should have re-
ceived overtime or vacation pay) (explain):
7 - Improper change of contract or work rules or work-
ing conditions (explain):
8 - Race, sex, religious, national origin, handicap, or age
discrimination




10 - Other (explain):
15. Other allegations or causes of action in the case, besides the
union's breach of the duty of fair representation, and/or the
employer's breach of contract:
1 __ No other allegations made
2 _ Tort claims (describe, e.g., assault, infliction of
mental distress, interference with contractual
relationship):
3 - ERISA claims (pensions) (explain):
4 - LMRDA claims (union democracy) (explain):
5 - Race, sex, religious, national origin, handicap, or age
discrimination claims under federal or state civil
rights statutes (explain):
6 - Other (explain):
16. If other allegations or causes of action are in the case, whom
were they made against:
1 __ Not applicable
2 - Employer only
3 - Union only
4 - Both
5 - Additional defendant(s) (explain):
17. Type of arbitration system involved in the case:
1 - None involved
2 __ Unknown or unclear
3 - Neutral outside arbitrator, or tie-breaker
4 - Joint labor-management grievance committee (look
closely if Teamster case)
5 __ Other (explain):
18. If the case is closed, what was the outcome:
1 - Not applicable
2 - Plaintiff won on DFR grounds (describe relief
awarded):
3 - Plaintiff lost on DFR grounds, but won on other
grounds (explain):
4 __ Plaintiff won on other grounds, and the DFR claims
were never resolved (explain):
5 __ Defendant won, and the case was dismissed (explain
if the defendant was awarded attorneys fees, or any
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other relief (e.g., damages on a counterclaim)):
6 - The case was settled (explain the terms of the settle-
ment agreement, if known):
7 - Other (explain):
19. If the case is still open, and if there are other causes of ac-
tion in the case, are the DFR claims still open, or have they
been resolved:
1 - Not applicable
2 - Still pending
3 - Resolved in plaintiff's favor (describe relief
awarded):
4 - Resolved in defendant's favor (explain if defendant
was awarded attorneys fees, damages on counter-
claims, or other relief):
5 - DFR claims settled (describe terms of the settlement,
if known):
6 - Other (explain):
20. If plaintiff won the DFR claims, regardless or whether other
claims are still pending, what was the procedural posture:
1 - Not applicable
2 - Motion for summary judgement
3 - Judge's opinion following bench trial
4 - Judge's opinion directing verdict in jury trial
5 - Jury verdict
6 - Judge's opinion following jury trial (e.g., motion for
JNOV) (explain):
7 - Other (explain):
21. If plaintiff lost the DFR claims, regardless of whether other
claims are still pending, what was the procedural posture:
1 - Not applicable
2 - Motion to dismiss
3 - Motion for summary judgment
4 - Judge's opinion following bench trial
5 - Judge's opinion directing verdict in jury trial
6 - Jury verdict




8 - Other (explain):
22. If plaintiff lost the DFR claims, regardless or whether other
claims are still pending, was the loss on procedural grounds:
1 - Not applicable
2 - No, lost on the merits
3 - Yes, missed statute of limitations (describe the limita-
tions period applied by the court):
4 - Yes, failed to exhaust internal union remedies
5 - Yes, failed to exhaust contractual remedies
6 - Yes, lost on other procedural grounds (explain):
23. Did the court resolve the allegations of union misconduct on
the merits, and if so, who won and what was the court's
reasoning:
1 - No, not reached
2 - Resolved in plaintiff's favor
3 - Resolved in defendant's favor
4 - Other (explain):
Explain briefly the court's reasoning, if known:
24. Did the court resolve the allegations of employer misconduct
on the merits, and if so, who won and what was the court's
reasoning:
1 - No, not reached
2 - Resolved in plaintiff's favor
3 - Resolved in defendant's favor
4 - Other (explain):
Explain briefly the court's reasoning, if known:
25. Was there an appeal at any stage of the proceedings, and if
so, explain:
1 __ No appeal
2 Yes, interlocutory appeal (explain issue on appeal
and its resolution by appellate court):
3 - Yes, appeal after final judgment by trial court (ex-




26. Describe and discuss any additional significant facts or issues
in the case not covered above:
C. Attorney Questionnaire
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION QUESTIONNAIRE
Instructions: Please use a separate questionnaire for each case cited
in the cover letter accompanying this questionnaire. Each ques-
tionnaire should be filled out by, or on behalf of, the attorney in
your office primarily responsible for handling each case. If more
than one questionnaire is to be filled out by, or on behalf of, a
single attorney, only the first questionnaire need be filled out in
its entirety, and only questions 1-3 need be filled out in the re-
maining questionnaires.
I would like to emphasize once again that your answers will be
kept strictly confidential, especially those relating to such sensitive
areas as the terms of any settlement agreements.
1. Case name and docket number:
2. Name, address, and phone number of the attorney primarily
responsible for handling the above-cited case.
3. If the above-cited case settled, please answer the following
questions:
a) If the underlying dispute involved the discharge of an em-




-No, because the employee did not seek rein-
statement
-No, because the employer objected to reinstatement.
-No, for other reasons (please explain):
b) Did the settlement agreement provide for the plaintiff to
receive monetary compensation from the defendant(s),
and if so, how much did the plaintiff receive?





-_ $5001 - $10,000
-_ $10,001 - $25,000
__ Over $25,000 (please state how much):
c) Please describe briefly any other terms of the settlement
agreement:
4. In what year was the attorney identified in question 2 admit-
ted to the bar?
5. At the time that attorney began work on the case cited in
question 1, approximately what percentage of his or her prac-
tice was in the area of labor law, excluding employment dis-
crimination and workers' compensation cases?





6. How many DFR cases had that attorney handled over the







7. If you regularly represent defendants in DFR cases, please an-
swer the following questions:
a) Is it your general policy to remove to federal court any
DFR cases filed against your clients in state court (assum-
ing the case is removable)?
b) Approximately how many DFR cases did you handle for
your clients in the courts from 1977 through 1982?
c) Approximately how many times from 1977 through 1982
did you represent clients against whom charges had been
filed with the NLRB alleging breaches of the duty of fair
representation?
d) In how many of those cases did the NLRB issue com-
[Vol. 34
1985] FAIR REPRESENTATION 171
plaints alleging DFR violations by your clients?
8. If you have any views on the duty of fair representation which
you would like to share - whether in general terms or with
specific reference to the case cited in question 1 (for example,
how would you like to see the cause of action changed, if Con-
gress were going to reform it through legislation) - please do
so on the back of this page.
Thank you for your cooperation.

